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“Big shifts coming for Southeast energy landscape” - Hear from Dominion Energy and Duke Energy this November
by William V. DePaulo, Esq. 15 Sep '20

15 Sep '20

So was this any part of the reason for canceling the ACP????? <https://infocastinc.com/event/southeast-renewables//?utm_source=SERenewable…> Duke Energy, Southern Company and Dominion Energy’s commitments to achieve carbon-free generation are a big game changer for renewable energy and will drive a dramatic shift in the Southeast energy landscape. Attend the fully virtual *Southeast Renewable Energy Summit* this November to hear from key energy players in the Southeast: - Learn about state commissioners’ perspectives on how to facilitate the growth of renewables in the region - Hear how the utilities plan to convert their carbon-free generation commitments into renewable procurement strategies and procurement - Tap into G&T, co-op, muni and corporate plans to procure renewables - Get updates on the planning for a regional ISO and the opportunities in MISO South - Understand how legislation, regulatory policies and utility procurements will open up opportunities in each state REGISTER <https://infocastinc.com/event/southeast-renewables//?utm_source=SERenewable…> ------------------------------ FEATURED SPEAKERS Katharine Bond *Senior Director, Public Policy & Strategy* DOMINION ENERGY Tim Echols *Vice Chair* GEORGIA PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION Laurel Meeks *Associate Business Development Manager* DUKE ENERGY Betsy McCorkle *Partner* KAIROS GOVERNMENT AFFAIRS Commissioner Brandon Presley MISSISSIPPI PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION Ted Thomas *Chairman* ARKANSAS PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION ------------------------------ YOUR VIRTUAL EXPERIENCE Tune in to all conference sessions, panels and Q&A discussions *live* or *on-demand*. Access the intuitive virtual platform securely from anywhere. Connect with attendees, speakers and sponsors through a robust direct messaging system, built-in video conferencing, and the networking lounge. <http://infocastinc.com/event/southeast-renewables//?utm_source=SERenewables…> TAKE A VIDEO TOUR <https://infocastinc.com/event/southeast-renewables//?utm_source=SERenewable…> ------------------------------ Get seen by your targeted audience. To learn more about *sponsorship opportunities*, please contact Peggy Franzino at peggyf(a)infocastevents.com. Irene Brooks *Client Relations Manager* | Information Forecast, Inc. To unsubscribe, please respond to this email with “Unsubscribe” in the subject line. Infocast, 20931 Burbank Boulevard, Suite B, Woodland Hills, CA 91367, United States <https://www.google.com/maps/search/20931+Burbank+Boulevard,+Suite+B,+Woodla…> . -- William V. DePaulo, Esq. 860 Court Street North, Suite 300 Lewisburg, WV 24901 Tel 304-342-5588 Fax 866-850-1501 william.depaulo(a)gmail.com *“The one thing that’s worth stockpiling is decency. Decency won’t save us, but it will make our altered lives more tolerable, come what may.” * Anastasia Edel 2020

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Fwd: [OHIO-CONS-COMM] Fracking companies want to release fracking water into the water supply
by Karen Yarnell 10 Jul '20

10 Jul '20

Is this on anyone's radar? Begin forwarded message: > From: Cathy Cowan Becker <becker.271(a)GMAIL.COM> > Date: July 10, 2020 at 7:51:12 AM EDT > To: OHIO-CONS-COMM(a)LISTS.SIERRACLUB.ORG > Subject: [OHIO-CONS-COMM] Fracking companies want to release fracking water into the water supply > Reply-To: Ohio Chapter Conservation Committee <OHIO-CONS-COMM(a)LISTS.SIERRACLUB.ORG> > > Did we know about this proposal? Apparently the fracking companies want to release water used in fracking into the water supply to be treated in regular water treatment plants. A professor in Pennsylvania says that will not remove the radioactive elements from fracking water. The EPA is expected to loosen standards on this sometime this year. > > https://cen.acs.org/environment/water/Wastewater-fracking-Growing-disposal-… > > They literally want to pour water full of radioactive elements into the natural water supply in Pennsylvania, West Virginia, and Ohio. > > Cathy > > > * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * > To unsubscribe from the OHIO-CONS-COMM list, send any message to OHIO-CONS-COMM-signoff-request(a)lists.sierraclub.org, or visit Listserv online. For all the latest news and activities, sign up for Sierra Club Insider, the Club's twice-monthly flagship e-newsletter. Listserv users are subject to the Sierra Club's Terms and Conditions.

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US utilities are skipping the gas ‘bridge’ in transition from coal to renewables | RenewEconomy
by William DePaulo 06 Jul '20

06 Jul '20

US utilities are skipping the gas ‘bridge’ in transition from coal to renewables | RenewEconomy https://reneweconomy.com.au/us-utilities-are-skipping-the-gas-bridge-in-tra…

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WARREN BUFFETT BOUGHT OUT DOMINION RESOURCES NAT GAS ASSETS AT SIGNIFICANT DISCOUNT......investment analysis below
by William V. DePaulo, Esq. 06 Jul '20

06 Jul '20

Summary Berkshire Hathaway finally makes a large deal, buying in the $10 billion range. Buffett followed his own advice and bought while sentiment was weak. Deal should be accretive for Berkshire Hathaway, Dominion Energy does not look like a winner in this deal. Article Thesis On the weekend, Berkshire Hathaway (BRK.A <https://seekingalpha.com/symbol/BRK.A>) (BRK.B <https://seekingalpha.com/symbol/BRK.B>) announced that they would acquire several natural gas assets from Dominion Energy (D <https://seekingalpha.com/symbol/D>) in a deal valued at $10 billion. Looking at the price of the deal and the assets Berkshire will get, it looks like Buffett's Berkshire is the winner in this deal, being able to acquire assets at a quite low valuation. Dominion Energy, on the other hand, does not seem to be much of a winner in this deal. The deal also has implications for other natural gas assets and their owners, as they now got the "stamp of approval" from Buffett himself. Source: Imgflip.com The Deal For Dominion's Assets The deal was first announced <https://www.cnbc.com/2020/07/05/warren-buffetts-berkshire-buys-dominion-ene…> on Sunday and values the assets at $9.7 billion. About $4 billion of that will be paid in cash, while Berkshire Hathaway will also assume $5.7 billion in associated debt. Net proceeds for Dominion Energy will be lower than $4 billion, however, as the company will have to pay taxes on the amount it receives, which is why net proceeds for Dominion are seen at just around $3 billion <https://seekingalpha.com/news/3588568-berkshire-hathaway-in-10b-deal-for-do…>. Dominion Energy still gets rid of close to $6 billion in debt on top of the cash proceeds it will receive, which will help clean up its balance sheet to some degree. The assets that Berkshire Hathaway will acquire consist of close to 8,000 miles of natural gas transmission pipelines, and 900 billion cubic feet of natural gas storage capacity. Dominion Energy will sell most of its natural gas-related assets in this deal. Both companies expect that the deal will close during the fourth quarter of 2020. Why Berkshire Is Buying Natural Gas Assets Now Buffett himself has oftentimes stated that buying when valuations are low is a key factor for outperformance, highly publicized quotes such as "Buy when there is blood in the streets" underline this belief. Berkshire Hathaway thus oftentimes does not buy what is in favor and expensive, but rather the stocks or assets that are currently unloved and available at low valuations. This certainly is true for natural gas-related assets and stocks right here: [image: Chart]Data by YCharts Shares of natural gas midstream players like Energy Transfer (ET <https://seekingalpha.com/symbol/ET>), Williams Companies (WMB <https://seekingalpha.com/symbol/WMB>), and Kinder Morgan (KMI <https://seekingalpha.com/symbol/KMI>) are down 30% to 50% from their respective 52-week highs, whereas the S&P 500 index is trading just marginally below all-time highs. The goal of buying what is unloved and trading at an undeservedly low valuation thus is accomplished in this deal -- natural gas and everything that is related clearly is not in favor right now. This means that players with a very long-term focus that do not worry about the near-term sentiment -- such as Berkshire Hathaway -- can make inexpensive buys right here. Berkshire Hathaway clearly sees value in the midstream industry, and they already own a meaningful natural gas asset base. Following the close of this acquisition, Berkshire Hathaway will own 18% <https://www.cnbc.com/2020/07/05/warren-buffetts-berkshire-buys-dominion-ene…> of all interstate natural gas pipelines in the US. Berkshire clearly sees value in natural gas assets, or, more precisely, in natural gas midstream assets. Why is that? There is a range of reasons why these assets could be quite valuable in the long term, including the following: - Natural gas is much cleaner than both oil and coal, thus switching towards natural gas use for electricity generation will be a win for the environment. Demand for natural gas should thus remain high for a long period of time, as it will have to replace coal-powered plants that will be phased out in the future. - Natural gas is a commodity that is not cyclical <https://seekingalpha.com/article/4336031-williams-was-punished-unfairly-har…>. Demand is mostly used for heating and for cooking, on top of electricity generation. During recessions people don't stop cooking or heating their homes, so unlike industrial metals, kerosene, for example, natural gas use is relatively consistent, no matter the strength of the economy. Buffett choosing to go for the stable, non-cyclical commodity makes sense as he wants to be conservative in this environment, showcased by past comments <https://seekingalpha.com/news/3567986-range-of-economic-possibilities-is-ex…> during the current crisis. - It becomes increasingly hard to build large infrastructure in the US (and many other countries), due to increasing regulation and bigger hurdles by authorities, environment watchdogs, etc. This means that existing assets will likely become more valuable, as they will become even harder to replace. The already strong moats around these midstream businesses will likely grow further, which will not only increase the value of these assets but which could also result in an attractive future negotiating position with customers. There is thus, overall, a range of reasons why natural gas midstream assets could be strong investments in the long run, and at the same time, they currently are unloved and inexpensive. We don't know yet what the EBITDA, cash flow, or net profit contribution from these assets will be for Berkshire Hathaway, but we can make some educated guesses based on the price natural gas midstream companies are trading at: [image: Chart]Data by YCharts Kinder Morgan, Williams, and Energy Transfer all are trading at less than 10 times EV to EBITDA, with Energy Transfer being valued at even less than 8 times its EBITDA. This results in 10%-12%+ EBITDA yields when one invests in these companies. Buffett chose to invest in Dominion Energy's assets instead of buying shares of these companies, so he may have gotten an even better deal. Even if not, terms must have been attractive for him to invest close to $10 billion, so EBITDA returns will likely be at least 10%. Based on Dominion Energy's new guidance -- they reduced their EPS estimate for 2020 by more than 20% -- the accretion of the assets that Berkshire Hathaway will buy could have been quite large. The planned asset sale is not the only reason for the guidance downward revision, though, so it is not possible to calculate the exact impact on a net earnings basis. Last but not least, it should be noted that Berkshire Hathaway held a cash position of close to $140 billion at the end of Q1, so they don't have to increase their debt or anything like that in order to finance the acquisition. Quite the contrary, cash was sitting around not generating any meaningful returns anyway (with 10-year treasury yields well below the rate of inflation). Buffett found a way to employ parts of this cash in an accretive way, buying quality assets with a strong moat, that are inflation-hedged. The deal also takes place at a time when the segment as a whole is unloved, which results in below-average valuations. To us, it thus clearly looks like Buffett's Berkshire Hathaway is the winner in this deal. What It Means For Dominion Energy And Natural Gas Names Dominion Energy has announced a new guidance range for this year's EPS, which are now seen at ~$3.50 <https://seekingalpha.com/pr/17921299-dominion-energy-agrees-to-sell-gas-tra…>, roughly 20% below the previous guidance midpoint. On top of that, the company also announced <https://seekingalpha.com/pr/17921299-dominion-energy-agrees-to-sell-gas-tra…> that it would reduce its dividend to about $2.50 per year, which equates to a dividend reduction of roughly one-third versus the previous payout of $3.76 per share. Management indicated that the future dividend growth rate would be faster to make up for that, but it is not clear whether this will really be beneficial for shareholders. Based on current prices, the dividend has been changed from a 4.5% yield with 2.5% annual growth to a 3% yield, with 6% annual growth. Assuming the dividend growth rate remains constant, it would take 7 years of 6% annual growth for the dividend to get back to the previous level. When we include the fact that the dividend would have continued to grow in the "old" scenario, and that dividend reinvestment would have been much more impactful due to the larger yield, the change does look even less beneficial. Overall, Dominion Energy and its owners do not look like they are the winners in this deal at all, and Dominion Energy may very well be a worse investment now than it was before this deal was announced. The deal between Berkshire Hathaway and Dominion Energy also has some implications for third parties, mainly natural gas infrastructure plays. They got the "stamp of approval" from Buffett, as he clearly sees these assets as viable long-term investments. This could result in a positive change in sentiment for the stock prices of midstream players such as Williams or Kinder Morgan. On top of that, it may also be a positive message for compressor players such as Archrock (AROC <https://seekingalpha.com/symbol/AROC>) -- Buffett buying natural gas assets is a pretty strong indicator that the US natural gas industry likely is not doomed at all. Takeaway The fact that Berkshire Hathaway had not been buying big during the March crash was quite confusing to many investors, but it looks like Buffett still is able to find attractive deals. It looks like Berkshire Hathaway is able to expand its natural gas pipeline footprint substantially, while sentiment is weak and valuations are low. These assets could be strong long-term investments, as natural gas will likely be important for decades, and as the value of these pipes could go up a lot. Overall, Berkshire looks like the winning party in this deal, while other natural gas infrastructure players got a bit of an endorsement from Buffett, which could improve sentiment (and share prices).

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Energy companies cancel construction of Atlantic Coast Pipeline
by William DePaulo 06 Jul '20

06 Jul '20

Energy companies cancel construction of Atlantic Coast Pipeline https://www.cnn.com/2020/07/05/us/duke-dominion-energy-cancel-atlantic-coas…

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Longview Ar FERC
by William DePaulo 26 Jun '20

26 Jun '20

https://elibrary.ferc.gov/idmws/common/downloadOpen.asp?downloadfile=202006…

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Wall Street Journal reports banks "tough" on nat gas shale loans......
by William V. DePaulo, Esq. via EC 22 Dec '19

22 Dec '19

banks-get-tough-on-shale-loans-as-fracking-forecasts-founder-11577010600 <https://www.wsj.com/articles/banks-get-tough-on-shale-loans-as-fracking-for…> Banks Get Tough on Shale Loans as Fracking Forecasts FlopOil and gas companies face tightened credit after wells produce less than projected Chevron has said it plans to take a charge of $10 billion to $11 billion, roughly half of it tied to shale gas assets. PHOTO: DANIEL ACKER/BLOOMBERG NEWS By Christopher M. Matthews, Bradley Olson and Allison Prang Dec. 22, 2019 5:30 am ET - SAVE - PRINT - TEXT - 69 <https://www.wsj.com/articles/banks-get-tough-on-shale-loans-as-fracking-for…> Some of the banks that helped fuel the fracking boom are beginning to question the industry’s fundamentals, as many shale wells produce less than companies forecast. Banks have begun to tighten requirements on revolving lines of credit, an essential lifeline for smaller companies, as these institutions revise estimates on the value of some shale reserves held as collateral for loans to producers, according to people familiar with the matter. Some large financial institutions, including Capital One Financial <https://quotes.wsj.com/COF>Corp. and JPMorgan Chase <https://quotes.wsj.com/JPM> & Co., are likely to decrease the size of current and future loans to shale companies linked to reserves as a result of their semiannual reviews of the loans, the people say. The banks are concerned that if some companies go bankrupt, their assets won’t cover the loans, the people say. JPMorgan Chase declined to comment. Capital One <https://quotes.wsj.com/COF> didn’t respond to requests for comment. The tightening financial pressure on shale producers is one of the reasons many are facing a reckoning going into next year. Chevron <https://quotes.wsj.com/CVX>Corp. said Dec. 10 that it plans to take a charge <https://www.wsj.com/articles/chevron-facing-fossil-fuels-glut-takes-10-bill…> of $10 billion to $11 billion, roughly half of it tied to shale gas assets, which it said won’t be profitable soon. Royal Dutch Shell <https://quotes.wsj.com/RDS.B> PLC said Friday it will take a roughly $2 billion impairment, and other companies are expected to follow suit in writing down assets, according to analysts and industry executives. The heat is greatest for small and midsize shale producers, including many whose wells aren’t producing as much oil and gas as they had projected to lenders and investors. Some of those companies may be forced out of business, said Clark Sackschewsky, the managing principal of accounting firm BDO’s Houston tax practice. Large companies are likely to weather the blow because of their size and global asset diversity, but for some smaller shale operators, tightening access to bank loans could prove disastrous. “We’ve got another year under our belts with the onshore fracking assets, which includes less than optimistic reserves results, less production than anticipated, a reduction in capital investment into the market,” Mr. Sackschewsky said. Oil and gas producers expect banks to cut their revolving lines of credit by 10% as a result of the reviews, according to a survey of companies by the law firm Haynes & Boone LLP. The cuts may be more severe, say some people familiar with the reviews. Banks have extended billions of dollars of reserve-backed loans, though the exact size of the market isn’t known. JPMorgan said in a regulatory filing in September that it has exposure to $44 billion in oil and gas loans, and Capital One <https://quotes.wsj.com/COF> said in October it has extended more than $3 billion in oil and gas loans. It wasn’t clear for either bank what proportion of those are backed by reserves. Banks have typically applied a 10% discount to the value of reserves, meaning a shale company could borrow against 90% of its reserves as collateral. Banks have typically lent as much as 60% of that value. But some are now discounting the value by as much as 20%, the people say. Meanwhile, some regional banks have begun writing off bad energy loans. Net charge-offs shot up at Huntington Bancshares <https://quotes.wsj.com/HBAN> in the last quarter. The Ohio-based lender attributed the move primarily to two energy loans where the borrowers’ production had not met expectations, Huntington Chief Executive Officer Stephen Steinour said in an interview. “Geology and the assumptions were just flawed,” Mr. Steinour said. Many investors have lost faith in the viability of shale drillers <https://www.wsj.com/articles/frackers-face-harsh-reality-as-wall-street-bac…>, as natural-gas prices stayed low and many companies broke promises on how much their wells would produce and when they would begin to turn a profit. As investors have retreated, cracks have begun to show. Energy companies accounted for more than 90% of defaults on corporate debt in the third quarter, according to Moody’s Investors Service. There were more than 30 oil-company bankruptcies in 2019, exceeding the number in 2018 and 2017. Exploration and production companies are now carrying more than $100 billion in debt, according to Haynes & Boone. Skepticism among banks has grown in part because lenders have more closely scrutinized public well data on production and seen that it is falling short of forecasts, as a Wall Street Journal analysis showed earlier this year. Specifically, banks have begun questioning shale producers’ predictions <https://www.wsj.com/articles/frackings-secret-problemoil-wells-arent-produc…>about their wells’ initial rate of decline, which are proving overly optimistic, according to engineers. If shale wells, which produce rapidly early and then taper off, are declining faster than predicted, questions arise regarding how much they will ultimately produce. SHARE YOUR THOUGHTS What do you think tightened credit requirements mean for the shale industry as a whole? Join the conversation below. Some lenders have flagged publicly that they will be less generous with loans in the future. “With respect to any new energy loans, we are highly cautious; it’s a very high bar we must clear,” said Paul B. Murphy, CEO of Cadence Bank, in an October call with analysts. The firm operates in Texas and the southeastern U.S. Bank lending has slowed across the board in the country’s hottest drilling region, the Permian basin in West Texas and New Mexico. After leading Texas last year, loan growth in the region shrunk to 4.8% below the state’s 7.5% average in the last quarter, the Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas said Thursday. More than a decade into the shale boom, investors are trying to wrap their arms around the true value of producers’ assets, said Michelle Foss, an energy fellow at Rice University’s Baker Institute. for Public Policy. “There is a struggle now for investors to determine what things are actually worth,” Ms. Foss said. Dwindling access to bank loans will put more pressure on an industry that has already lost access to other sources of money. Without new cash infusions, many companies may be unable to drill their undeveloped reserves, which could further diminish the value of their assets. Some shale companies have been lobbying the Securities and Exchange Commission to change its rules governing reserves reporting, allowing them to count undeveloped assets as reserves for a longer period. The SEC currently allows oil and gas producers to report reserves as “proved” if the companies plan to develop them within five years. In an August letter to the SEC, Continental Resources <https://quotes.wsj.com/CLR> Inc., one of the largest shale companies, pushed for the regulator to extend that period to 10 years. The company, founded by the billionaire prospector Harold Hamm, said its proved reserves would be around 16% higher with such a rule change. A Continental spokeswoman declined to comment. An SEC spokesman didn’t respond to a request for comment. Write to Christopher M. Matthews at christopher.matthews(a)wsj.com, Bradley Olson at Bradley.Olson(a)wsj.com and Allison Prang at allison.prang(a)wsj.com William V. DePaulo, Esq. 860 Court Street North, Suite 300 Lewisburg, WV 24901 Tel 304-342-5588 Fax 866-850-1501 william.depaulo(a)gmail.com

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This new ‘battery’ aims to spark a carbon capture revolution
by William V. DePaulo, Esq. via EC 15 Nov '19

15 Nov '19

This new ‘battery’ aims to spark a carbon capture revolution <https://www.pbs.org/newshour/science/this-new-battery-aims-to-spark-a-carbo…> Science <https://www.pbs.org/newshour/science> Nov 15, 2019 2:31 PM EST Renewable energy alone is not enough to turn the tide of the climate crisis. Despite the rapid expansion <https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id=38752> of wind, solar and other clean energy technologies, human behavior and consumption are flooding our skies with too much carbon, and simply supplanting fossil fuels won’t stop global warming. To make some realistic attempt at preventing a grim future <https://www.rff.org/publications/reports/global-energy-outlook-2019/>, humans need to be able to physically remove carbon from the air. That’s why carbon capture technology is slowly being integrated into energy and industrial facilities across the globe. Typically set up to collect carbon from an exhaust stream, this technology sops up greenhouse gases before they spread into Earth’s airways. But those industrial practices work because these factories produce gas pollutants like carbon dioxide and methane at high concentrations. Carbon capture can’t draw CO2 from regular open air, where the concentration of this prominent pollutant is too diffuse. Moreover, the energy sector’s transition toward decarbonization is moving too slowly. It will take years — likely decades <https://www.pbs.org/newshour/science/how-your-brain-stops-you-from-taking-c…> — before the world’s hundreds of CO2-emitting industrial plants adopt capture technology. Humans have pumped about 2,000 gigatonnes <https://www.carbonbrief.org/analysis-why-the-ipcc-1-5c-report-expanded-the-…> — billions of metric tons — of carbon dioxide into the air since industrialization, and there will be more. But what if you could have a personal-sized carbon capture machine on your car, commercial airplane or solar-powered home? Chemical engineers at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology have created a new device that can remove carbon dioxide from the air at any concentration. Published in October in the journal Energy & Environmental Science, the project is the latest bid to directly capture CO2 emissions and keep them from accelerating and worsening future climate disasters. Think of the invention as a quasi-battery, in terms of its shape, its construction and how it works to collect carbon dioxide. You pump electricity into the battery, and while the device stores this charge, a chemical reaction occurs that absorbs CO2 from the surrounding atmosphere — a process known as direct air capture. The CO2 can be extracted by discharging the battery, releasing the gas, so the CO2 then can be pumped into the ground. The researchers describe this back-and-forth as electroswing adsorption. [image: A cross-section of an electroswing adsorber, which is essentially an electrochemical cell -- that is, a battery. The battery has two active (negative) electrodes on the outside and a positive (counter) electrode in the middle (red). When electricity runs into the battery, the active layers, which are covered with quinone, collect CO2 from the surrounding air. Image by Sahag Voskian] A cross-section of an electroswing adsorber, which is essentially an electrochemical cell — that is, a battery. The battery has two active (negative) electrodes on the outside and a positive (counter) electrode in the middle (red). When electricity runs into the battery, the active layers, which are covered with quinone, collect CO2 from the surrounding air. Image by Sahag Voskian “I realized there was a gap in the spectrum of solutions,” said Sahag Voskian, who co-led the project with fellow MIT chemical engineer T. Alan Hatton. “Many current systems, for instance, are very bulky and can only be used for large-scale power plants or industrial applications.” Relative to current technology, this electroswing adsorber could be retrofitted onto smaller, mobile sources of emissions like autos and planes, the study states. Voskian also pictures the battery being scaled to plug into power plants powered by renewables, such as wind farms and solar fields, which are known to create more energy than they can store. Rather than lose this power, these renewable plants could set up a side hustle where their excess energy is used to capture carbon. “That’s one of the nice aspects of this technology — is that direct linkage with renewables,” said Jennifer Wilcox, a chemical engineer at Worcester Polytechnic Institute, who was not involved in the study. Imagine turning the more than 2 million U.S. homes with rooftop solar into mini-carbon capture plants. The advantage of an electricity-based system for carbon capture is that it scales linearly. If you need 10 times more capacity, you simply build 10 times more of these “electroswing batteries” and stack them, Voskian said. He estimates that if you cover a football field with these devices in stacks that are tens of feet high, they could remove about 200,000 to 400,000 metric tons of CO2 a year. Build another 100,000 of these fields, and they could bring carbon dioxide in the atmosphere back to preindustrial levels within 40 years. One hundred thousand installations sounds like a lot, but keep in mind that these devices can be built to any size and run off the excess electricity created by renewables like wind and solar, which at the moment cannot be easily stored <https://www.pbs.org/newshour/science/can-germany-revive-its-stalled-transit…>. Imagine turning the more than 2 million U.S. homes with rooftop solar <https://www.seia.org/news/united-states-surpasses-2-million-solar-installat…>into mini-carbon capture plants. On paper, this invention sounds like a game changer. But it has a number of feasibility hurdles to surmount before it leaves the laboratory. How this electroswing battery works The idea of using electricity to trigger a chemical reaction — electrochemistry — as a means for capturing carbon dioxide isn’t new. It has been around for nearly 25 years, in fact <https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/0196890495001487>. But Voskian and Hatton have now added two special materials into the equation: quinone and carbon nanotubes. A carbon nanotube is a human-made atom-sized cylinder — a sheet of carbon molecules spread into a single layer and wrapped up like a tube. Aside from being more than 100 times stronger <https://www.nature.com/articles/s41467-019-10959-7> than stainless steel or titanium, carbon nanotubes are excellent conductors of electricity, making them sturdy building blocks for electrified equipment. Much like a regular battery, Voskian and Hatton’s device has a positive electrode and a negative electrode — “plus” and “minus” sides. But the minus side — the negative electrode — is infused with quinone, a chemical that, after being electrically charged, reacts and sticks to CO2. When you charge the battery, you have carbon capture. When you discharge it, you release the carbon that you captured. “You can think of it like the charge and discharge of a battery,” Voskian said. “When you charge the battery, you have carbon capture. When you discharge it, you release the carbon that you captured.” Their approach is unique because all the energy required for their direct air capture comes from electricity. The three major startups in this emerging space — Climeworks <https://www.climeworks.com/>, Global Thermostat <https://globalthermostat.com/>and Carbon Engineering <https://carbonengineering.com/> — rely on a mixture of electric and thermal (heat) energy, Wilcox said, with thermal energy being the dominant factor. For power plants and industrial facilities, that excess heat — or waste heat, a byproduct of their everyday work, isn’t a perfect fit for carbon capture. Waste heat isn’t very consistent. Imagine standing next to a fire — its warmth changes as the flames flit about. [image: The electroswing adsorbers can be stacked, so air can flow between them. Image by Sahag Voskian] The electroswing adsorbers can be stacked, so air can flow between them. Image by Sahag Voskian This heat can come from carbon-friendly options — such as a hydrothermal plant — but some current startups are preparing their capture systems to run on thermal energy from fossil-fuel burning facilities <https://globalthermostat.com/the-gt-solution/>. So they may capture 1.5 tons of CO2, but they also generate about half a ton in the process In Voskian’s operation, “We don’t have any of that. We have full control over the energetics of our process,” he said. Will it work? Voskian and Hatton, who have launched a startup called Verdox, write in their study that operating electroswing carbon capture would cost between $50 to $100 per metric ton of CO2. “If it’s true, that’s a great breakthrough,” said Richard Newell, president and CEO of Resources for the Future, a nonprofit research organization that develops energy and environmental policy on carbon capture <https://www.rff.org/publications/reports/global-energy-outlook-2019/>. But, he cautioned, “the distance between showing something in the laboratory and then demonstrating it at a commercial scale is very big.” If it’s true, that’s a great breakthrough. — Richard Newell, president and CEO of Resources for the Future The costs for capturing carbon and storing it (or sequestration) typically fall into three bins: the price of physically capturing the gas, the price of transporting the CO2 to a disposal site and the price of burying it in the ground. Direct air capture is the most expensive form of sequestration because CO2 concentrations in the atmosphere are so low. “Recent estimates for direct air capture are in the range of $125 to $325 per ton,” Newell said. It is cheaper to collect carbon in an industrial setting where the pollution is high. The most optimal locations are natural gas production sites, ethanol plants and ammonia factories, where the costs range from $20 to $30 per metric ton of CO2, Newell said. Head to a power plant or cement maker — where the facilities are bigger — and costs are $50 to $100 per metric ton. All of this means the costs of Voskian and Hatton’s device would be on par with the cheapest options for carbon sequestration in general, not just among the market for direct air capture. [image: Air, including carbon dioxide (red), flows in between the stacks of electroswing adsorbers. Below: Once electrified (white), the quinone attracts carbon dioxide out of the air. Image by Sahag Voskian] Air, including carbon dioxide (red), flows in between the stacks of electroswing adsorbers. Below: Once electrified (white), the quinone attracts carbon dioxide out of the air. Image by Sahag Voskian This price point for electroswing seems sensible but a little surprising, Wilcox said, given carbon nanotubes are two to 10 times more expensive than the base materials for other forms of direct air carbon capture <https://www.nap.edu/download/25259>. She also worries that carbon capture technology for large industrial operations has reached a stage of development where it might be difficult to catch up to and outcompete them. She co-authored a report earlier this year with the National Academy of Sciences that predicts the price of direct air carbon capture will drop over time, but reach a competitive price point of $100 per metric ton of CO2 until the second half of the century, after significant deployment. “Scale up will take time and learning by doing should help in cost reductions,” Wilcox said, adding that current direct air startups are also solidifying their positions in the market. “Climeworks is at a commercial scale. Global Thermostat and Carbon Engineering are just about there.” Scale up will take time. — Jennifer Wilcox, chemical engineer, Worcester Polytechnic Institute Moreover, she questions the ease at which electroswing scrubbers could be adapted for transportation, contrasting the situation with catalytic converters used by cars to prevent nitrogen oxides (NOx) pollution. An automobile’s catalytic converter reduces NOx emissions by turning the pollutant into non-harmful nitrogen and water vapor. That strategy won’t work for CO2, given the end goal is burying it. If your car is burning fuel and capturing carbon from the tailpipe, the CO2 would need to be stored in a tank, which would quickly weigh down the vehicle. What would one do with compressed tanks of CO2? “You’d have to establish a secondary market for taking CO2 tanks off people’s cars,” Wilcox said, which would be difficult given there isn’t much commercial demand for carbon dioxide. All that said, Wilcox and Newell believe electroswing tech is an interesting new arena for carbon capture. Given nearly 40 billion metric tons of CO2 are still added to the atmosphere each year, any feasible solution for climate mediation deserves deployment, they said. “We can’t meet our goals by just avoiding CO2. It’s not going to work anymore,” Wilcox said. “We need all hands on deck.” Left: Smoke and steam billows from Belchatow Power Station, Europe's largest coal-fired power plant near Belchatow, Poland on November 28, 2018. Inventors claim a new carbon capture “battery” could be retrofitted for industrial plants but also for mobile sources of CO2 emissions like cars and airplanes. Photo by REUTERS/Kacper Pempel Related - Jane Fonda: ‘Older women have always tended to be the bravest’ <https://www.pbs.org/newshour/arts/jane-fonda-older-women-have-always-tended…> By Joshua Barajas - Only 2 countries are meeting their climate pledges. Here’s how the 10 worst could improve <https://www.pbs.org/newshour/science/only-2-countries-are-meeting-their-cli…> By Nsikan Akpan - How more organic farming could worsen global warming <https://www.pbs.org/newshour/science/how-more-organic-farming-could-worsen-…> By Courtney Vinopal - The hotter the planet grows, the less children are learning <https://www.pbs.org/newshour/science/kids-learn-less-on-hot-days-global-war…> By Nsikan Akpan Go Deeper - carbon emissions <https://www.pbs.org/newshour/tag/carbon-emissions> - chemistry <https://www.pbs.org/newshour/tag/chemistry> - climate change <https://www.pbs.org/newshour/tag/climate-change> - global warming <https://www.pbs.org/newshour/tag/global-warming> - innovation and invention <https://www.pbs.org/newshour/tag/invention> - massachusetts institute of technology <https://www.pbs.org/newshour/tag/massachusetts-institute-of-technology> [image: Nsikan Akpan] <https://www.pbs.org/newshour/author/nsikan-akpan> By — Nsikan Akpan <https://www.pbs.org/newshour/author/nsikan-akpan> Nsikan Akpan is the digital science producer for PBS NewsHour and co-creator of the award-winning, NewsHour digital series ScienceScope <https://www.pbs.org/newshour/tag/sciencescope>. For secure communication, he can be reached via Signal (240) 516-8357. ------------------------------ <https://twitter.com/MoNscience> William V. DePaulo, Esq. 860 Court Street North, Suite 300 Lewisburg, WV 24901 Tel 304-342-5588 Fax 866-850-1501 william.depaulo(a)gmail.com

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NYT - 85 Environmental Rules Being Rolled Back Under Trump
by William V. DePaulo, Esq. via EC 19 Sep '19

19 Sep '19

https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2019/climate/trump-environment-rollback… Sources: Harvard Law School’s Environmental Regulation Rollback Tracker <http://environment.law.harvard.edu/policy-initiative/regulatory-rollback-tr…>; Columbia Law School’s Climate Deregulation Tracker <http://columbiaclimatelaw.com/resources/climate-deregulation-tracker/> 85 Environmental Rules Being Rolled Back Under Trump By NADJA POPOVICH, LIVIA ALBECK-RIPKA and KENDRA PIERRE-LOUIS UPDATED Sept. 12, 2019 President Trump has made eliminating federal regulations a priority <https://www.nytimes.com/2017/07/19/business/white-house-boasts-of-its-savin…>. His administration, with help from Republicans in Congress, has often targeted environmental rules it sees as burdensome to the fossil fuel industry and other big businesses. A New York Times analysis, based on research from Harvard Law School <https://eelp.law.harvard.edu/regulatory-rollback-tracker/>, Columbia Law School <http://columbiaclimatelaw.com/resources/climate-deregulation-tracker/> and other sources, counts more than 80 environmental rules and regulations on the way out under Mr. Trump. Our list represents two types of policy changes: rules that were officially reversed and rollbacks still in progress. The Trump administration has released an aggressive schedule to try to finalize many of these rollbacks this year. The Trump administration has often used a “one-two punch” when rolling back environmental rules, said Caitlin McCoy, a fellow in the Environmental and Energy Law Program at Harvard Law School who tracks regulatory rollbacks. “First a delay rule to buy some time, and then a final substantive rule.” But the process of rolling back regulations has not always been smooth. In some cases, the administration has failed to provide a strong legal argument in favor of proposed changes or agencies have skipped key steps in the rulemaking process, like notifying the public and asking for comment. In several cases, courts have ordered agencies to enforce their own rules. Several environmental rules — summarized at the bottom of this page — were rolled back and then later reinstated, often following legal challenges <https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/06/climate/trump-administration-environment…>. Other rollbacks remain mired in court. All told, the Trump administration’s environmental rollbacks could significantly increase greenhouse gas emissions and lead to thousands of extra deaths from poor air quality every year, according to a recent report <https://www.law.nyu.edu/sites/default/files/climate-and-health-showdown-in-…> prepared by New York University Law School's State Energy and Environmental Impact Center. Here are the details for each of the policies targeted by the administration so far. *Are there rollbacks we missed? Email climateteam(a)nytimes.com <climateteam(a)nytimes.com> or tweet @nytclimate <https://twitter.com/nytclimate>.* Air pollution and emissions Completed 1. Canceled a requirement for oil and gas companies to report methane emissions. Environmental Protection Agency | Read more <https://www.epa.gov/newsreleases/epa-withdraws-information-request-oil-and-…> 2. Revised and partially repealed an Obama-era rule limiting methane emissions on public lands, including intentional venting and flaring from drilling operations. Interior Department | Read more <https://www.nytimes.com/2018/09/18/climate/trump-methane-rollback.html> 3. Loosened a Clinton-era rule designed to limit toxic emissions from major industrial polluters. E.P.A. | Read more <https://www.vox.com/energy-and-environment/2018/1/26/16936104/epa-trump-tox…> 4. Stopped enforcing a 2015 rule that prohibited the use of hydrofluorocarbons, powerful greenhouse gases, in air-conditioners and refrigerators. E.P.A. | Read more <https://insideclimatenews.org/news/27062018/hfcs-global-warming-climate-pol…> 5. Repealed a requirement that state and regional authorities track tailpipe emissions from vehicles traveling on federal highways. Transportation Department | Read more <https://usa.streetsblog.org/2018/05/31/trump-admin-snuffs-out-climate-progr…> 6. Reverted to a weaker 2009 pollution permitting program for new power plants and expansions. E.P.A. | Read more <https://eelp.law.harvard.edu/2018/12/new-source-review/> 7. Amended rules that govern how refineries monitor pollution in surrounding communities. E.P.A. | Read more <https://eelp.law.harvard.edu/2018/12/petroleum-refinery-sector-rule-neshaps…> 8. Directed agencies to stop using an Obama-era calculation of the “social cost of carbon” that rulemakers used to estimate the long-term economic benefits of reducing carbon dioxide emissions. Executive Order | Read more <http://www.sciencemag.org/news/2017/08/trump-s-attack-social-cost-carbon-co…> 9. Withdrew guidance that federal agencies include greenhouse gas emissions in environmental reviews. But several district courts have ruled that emissions must be included in such reviews. Executive Order; Council on Environmental Quality | Read more <https://www.eenews.net/greenwire/stories/1060052285> 10. Lifted a summertime ban on the use of E15, a gasoline blend made of 15 percent ethanol. (Burning gasoline with a higher concentration of ethanol in hot conditions increases smog.) E.P.A. | Read more <https://www.nytimes.com/2019/05/31/climate/trump-ethanol-fuel-ban.html> In process 11. Proposed rules to end federal requirements that oil and gas companies install technology to inspect for and fix methane leaks from wells, pipelines and storage facilities. E.P.A. | Read more <https://www.nytimes.com/2019/08/29/climate/epa-methane-greenhouse-gas.html> 12. Proposed weakening Obama-era fuel-economy standards for cars and light trucks. The proposal also challenges California’s right to set its own more stringent standards, which other states can choose to follow. E.P.A. and Transportation Department | Read more <https://www.nytimes.com/2018/08/02/climate/trump-auto-emissions-california.…> 13. Announced intent to withdraw the United States from the Paris climate agreement. (The process of withdrawing cannot be completed until 2020.) Executive Order | Read more <https://www.nytimes.com/2017/06/01/climate/trump-paris-climate-agreement.ht…> 14. Proposed repeal of the Clean Power Plan, which would have set strict limits on carbon emissions from coal- and gas-fired power plants. In April 2019, the E.P.A. sent a replacement plan, which would let states set their own rules, to the White House for budget review. Executive Order; E.P.A. | Read more <https://www.nytimes.com/2018/08/21/climate/epa-coal-pollution-deaths.html> 15. Proposed eliminating Obama-era restrictions that in effect required newly built coal power plants to capture carbon dioxide emissions. E.P.A. | Read more <https://www.nytimes.com/2018/12/04/climate/epa-coal-carbon-capture.html> 16. Proposed a legal justification for weakening an Obama-era rule that limited mercury emissions from coal power plants. E.P.A. | Read more <https://www.nytimes.com/2018/12/28/climate/mercury-coal-pollution-regulatio…> 17. Proposed revisions to standards for carbon dioxide emissions from new, modified and reconstructed power plants. Executive Order; E.P.A. | Read more <https://eelp.law.harvard.edu/2017/09/ghg-new-source-performance-standards-f…> 18. Began review of emissions rules for power plant start-ups, shutdowns and malfunctions. In April, the E.P.A. filed an order reversing a requirement that 36 states follow the emissions rule. E.P.A. | Read more <https://eelp.law.harvard.edu/2017/09/power-plant-startup-shutdown-and-malfu…> 19. Proposed relaxing Obama-era requirements that companies monitor and repair methane leaks at oil and gas facilities. E.P.A. | Read more <https://www.nytimes.com/2018/09/10/climate/methane-emissions-epa.html?modul…> 20. Proposed changing rules aimed at cutting methane emissions from landfills. In May, 2019, a federal judge ruled against the E.P.A. for failing to enforce the existing law and gave the agency a fall deadline for finalizing state and federal rules. E.P.A. said it is reviewing the decision. E.P.A. | Read more <https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/court-orders-epa-to-address-land…> 21. Announced a rewrite of an Obama-era rule meant to reduce air pollution in national parks and wilderness areas. E.P.A. | Read more <https://www.eenews.net/greenwire/2018/01/19/stories/1060071465> 22. Weakened oversight of some state plans for reducing air pollution in national parks. (In Texas, the E.P.A. rejected an Obama-era plan that would have required the installation of equipment at some coal-burning power plants to reduce sulfur dioxide emissions.) E.P.A. | Read more <https://eelp.law.harvard.edu/2018/04/regional-haze-state-implementation-pla…> 23. Proposed repealing leak-repair, maintenance and reporting requirements for large refrigeration and air conditioning systems containing hydrofluorocarbons. E.P.A. | Read more <https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/powerpost/paloma/the-energy-202/2018/09…> 24. Proposed limiting the ability of individuals and communities to challenge E.P.A.-issued pollution permits before a panel of agency judges. E.P.A. | Read more <https://www.nytimes.com/2019/08/12/climate/endangered-species-act-changes.h…> Drilling and extraction Completed 25. Made significant cuts to the borders of two national monuments in Utah and recommended border and resource management changes to several more. Presidential Proclamation; Interior Department | Read more <https://www.nytimes.com/2017/12/04/us/trump-bears-ears.html> 26. Rescinded water pollution regulations for fracking on federal and Indian lands. Interior Department | Read more <http://www.latimes.com/politics/essential/la-pol-ca-essential-politics-upda…> 27. Scrapped a proposed rule that required mines to prove they could pay to clean up future pollution. E.P.A. | Read more <https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2017/dec/17/donald-trump-epa-mining…> 28. Withdrew a requirement that Gulf oil rig owners prove they could cover the costs of removing rigs once they have stopped producing. Interior Department | Read more <https://www.nytimes.com/2018/03/10/business/offshore-drilling-trump-adminis…> 29. Approved construction of the Dakota Access pipeline less than a mile from the Standing Rock Sioux reservation. Under the Obama administration, the Army Corps of Engineers had said it would explore alternative routes. Executive Order; Army | Read more <https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/07/us/army-approves-construction-of-dakota-…> 30. Revoked an Obama-era executive order designed to preserve ocean, coastal and Great Lakes waters in favor of a policy focused on energy production and economic growth. Executive Order | Read more <https://www.apnews.com/57d405229ba844f59f9f2d06c65c4318> 31. Changed how the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission considers the indirect effects of greenhouse gas emissions in environmental reviews of pipelines. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission | Read more <https://www.eenews.net/eenewspm/stories/1060082141> 32. Permitted the use of seismic air guns for gas and oil exploration in the Atlantic Ocean. The practice, which can kill marine life and disrupt fisheries, was blocked under the Obama administration. National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration | Read more <https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-11-30/trump-paves-way-for-air-…> 33. Loosened offshore drilling safety regulations implemented by the Obama administration following the 2010 Deepwater Horizon explosion and oil spill. The revised rules include reduced testing requirements for blowout prevention systems. Interior Department | Read more <https://www.nytimes.com/2019/05/02/climate/offshore-drilling-safety-rollbac…> In process 34. Completed preliminary environmental reviews to clear the way for drilling in the Arctic National Wildlife Refuge. Congress; Interior Department | Read more <https://www.nytimes.com/2018/12/20/climate/alaska-anwr-oil-drilling-proposa…> 35. Proposed opening most of America’s coastal waters to offshore oil and gas drilling, but delayed the plan after a federal judge ruled that Mr. Trump’s reversal of an Obama-era ban on drilling in the Arctic Ocean was unlawlful. Interior Department | Read more <https://www.nytimes.com/2019/04/25/climate/offshore-drilling-delay.html> 36. Lifted an Obama-era freeze on new coal leases on public lands. But, in April 2019, a judge ruled that the Interior Department could not begin selling new leases without completing an environmental review. A month later, the agency published a draft assessment that concluded restarting federal coal leasing would have little environmental impact. Executive Order; Interior Department | Read more <https://www.nytimes.com/2019/04/19/climate/court-trump-coal-mining-setback.…> 37. Repealed an Obama-era rule governing royalties for oil, gas and coal leases on federal lands, which replaced a 1980s rule that critics said allowed companies to underpay the federal government. A federal judge struck down the Trump administration’s repeal. The Interior Department is reviewing the decision. Interior Department | Read more <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-interior-royalties/federal-court-dis…> 38. Proposed “streamlining” the approval process for drilling for oil and gas in national forests. Agriculture Department; Interior Department | Read more <https://www.outsideonline.com/2373896/trump-wants-speed-drilling-national-f…> 39. Ordered review of regulations on oil and gas drilling in national parks where mineral rights are privately owned. Executive Order; Interior Department | Read more <https://www.vox.com/science-and-health/2017/4/20/15272642/trump-drill-oil-g…> 40. Recommended shrinking three marine protected areas, or opening them to commercial fishing. Executive Order; National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration | Read more <https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2018/jan/02/us-ocean-monuments-envi…> 41. Ordered review of regulations on offshore oil and gas exploration by floating vessels in the Arctic that were developed after a 2013 accident <http://www.nytimes.com/2013/01/02/business/energy-environment/breakaway-oil…>. The Interior Department said it was “considering full rescission or revision of this rule.” Executive Order; Interior Department | Read more <https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2017/05/03/2017-09087/implementin…> 42. Approved the Keystone XL pipeline rejected by President Barack Obama, but a federal judge blocked the project from going forward without an adequate environmental review process. Mr. Trump later attempted to side-step the ruling by issuing a presidential permit, but the project remains tied up in court. Executive Order; State Department | Read more <https://www.washingtonpost.com/climate-environment/2019/03/29/trump-signs-p…> Infrastructure and planning Completed 43. Revoked Obama-era flood standards for federal infrastructure projects, like roads and bridges. The standards required the government to account for sea-level rise and other climate change effects. Executive Order | Read more <https://www.nytimes.com/2017/08/15/climate/flooding-infrastructure-climate-…> 44. Relaxed the environmental review process for federal infrastructure projects. Executive Order | Read more <https://www.nytimes.com/2017/08/15/climate/flooding-infrastructure-climate-…> 45. Revoked a directive for federal agencies to minimize impacts on water, wildlife, land and other natural resources when approving development projects. Executive Order | Read more <https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/presidential-executive-orde…> 46. Revoked an Obama executive order promoting “climate resilience” in the northern Bering Sea region of Alaska, which withdrew local waters from oil and gas leasing and established a tribal advisory council to consult on local environmental issues. Executive Order | Read more <https://www.adn.com/arctic/2017/04/29/bering-sea-tribal-groups-slam-alaska-…> 47. Revoked an Obama executive order that set a goal of cutting the federal government’s greenhouse gas emissions by 40 percent over 10 years. Executive Order | Read more <http://columbiaclimatelaw.com/climate-deregulation-tracker/president-issues…> 48. Reversed an update to the Bureau of Land Management’s public land use planning process. Congress | Read more <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-congress-publicland/senate-revokes-o…> 49. Withdrew an Obama-era order to consider climate change in managing natural resources in national parks. National Park Service | Read more <https://www.eenews.net/stories/1060059511> 50. Restricted most Interior Department environmental studies to one year in length and a maximum of 150 pages, citing a need to reduce paperwork. Interior Department | Read more <https://www.eenews.net/stories/1060059865> 51. Withdrew a number of Obama-era Interior Department climate change and conservation policies that the agency said could “burden the development or utilization of domestically produced energy resources.” Interior Department | Read more <https://www.hcn.org/articles/climate-change-interior-department-revokes-cli…> 52. Eliminated the use of an Obama-era planning system designed to minimize harm from oil and gas activity on sensitive landscapes, such as national parks. Interior Department | Read more <http://columbiaclimatelaw.com/climate-deregulation-tracker/blm-issues-inter…> 53. Eased the environmental review processes for small wireless infrastructure projects with the goal of expanding 5G wireless networks. Federal Communications Commission | Read more <https://www.eenews.net/greenwire/2018/03/22/stories/1060077191> 54. Withdrew Obama-era policies designed to maintain or, ideally improve, natural resources affected by federal projects. Interior Department | Read more <https://www.eenews.net/stories/1060091417> In process 55. Proposed plans to streamline the environmental review process for Forest Service projects. Agriculture Department | Read more <https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2018/01/03/2017-28298/national-en…> Animals Completed 56. Changed the way the Endangered Species Act is applied, making it more difficult to protect wildlife from long-term threats posed by climate change. Interior Department | Read more <https://www.nytimes.com/2018/07/19/climate/endangered-species-act-changes.h…> 57. Opened nine million acres of Western land to oil and gas drilling by weakening habitat protections for the sage grouse, an imperiled bird with an elaborate mating dance <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=UtU_ICPuzV8>. Interior Department | Read more <https://www.nytimes.com/2019/03/15/climate/trump-sage-grouse.html> 58. Overturned a ban on the use of lead ammunition and fishing tackle on federal lands. Interior Department | Read more <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-Interior Department-zinke-idUSKBN16930Z> 59. Overturned a ban on the hunting of predators in Alaskan wildlife refuges. Congress | Read more <http://www.adn.com/alaska-news/wildlife/2017/04/10/congress-and-trump-revok…> 60. Ended an Obama-era rule barring hunters on some Alaska public lands from using bait to lure and kill grizzly bears. National Park Service; Interior Department | Read more <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-alaska-hunting-bears/us-proposes-end-of-…> 61. Withdrew proposed limits on the number of endangered marine mammals and sea turtles that people who fish could unintentionally kill or injure with sword-fishing nets on the West Coast. In 2018, California issued a state rule prohibiting the use of the nets the rule was intending to regulate. National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration | Read more <http://www.latimes.com/local/lanow/la-me-ln-trump-marine-mammals-20170612-s…> 62. Amended fishing regulations for a number of species to allow for longer seasons and higher catch rates. National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration | Read more <https://sero.nmfs.noaa.gov/sustainable_fisheries/gulf_sa/cmp/2017/framework…> 63. Rolled back a roughly 40-year-old interprentation of a policy aimed at protecting migratory birds, potentially running afoul of treaties with Canada and Mexico. Interior Department | Read more <https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/energy-environment/wp/2018/04/13/the-tr…> 64. Overturned a ban on using parts of migratory birds in handicrafts made by Alaskan Natives. Interior Department | Read more <https://www.fws.gov/alaska/ambcc/News_files/NR%2007-21-2017%20Migratory%20B…> In process 65. Proposed relaxing environmental protections for salmon and smelt in California’s Central Valley in order to free up water for farmers. Executive Order; Interior Department | Read more <https://www.nytimes.com/2019/02/12/climate/david-bernhardt-endangered-speci…> Toxic substances and safety Completed 66. Rejected a proposed ban on chlorpyrifos, a pesticide linked to developmental disabilities in children. E.P.A. | Read more <https://www.nytimes.com/2019/07/18/climate/epa-chlorpyrifos-pesticide-ban.h…> 67. Narrowed the scope of a 2016 law mandating safety assessments for potentially toxic chemicals, like dry-cleaning solvents and paint strippers. The E.P.A. will focus on direct exposure and exclude air, water and ground contamination. E.P.A. | Read more <https://www.nytimes.com/2018/06/07/us/politics/epa-toxic-chemicals.html> 68. Reversed an Obama-era rule that required braking system upgrades for “high hazard” trains hauling flammable liquids, like oil and ethanol. Transportation Department | Read more <https://www.opb.org/news/article/oil-train-safety-rule-rollback-by-trump/> 69. Removed copper filter cake, an electronics manufacturing byproduct comprised of heavy metals, from the “hazardous waste” list. E.P.A. | Read more <https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2017/10/02/2017-21112/hazardous-w…> In process 70. Announced a review of an Obama-era rule lowering coal dust limits in mines. The head of the Mine Safety and Health Administration said there were no immediate plans to change the dust limit, but the review is continuing. Labor Department | Read more <https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2018/02/22/climate/black-lung-resurgenc…> Water pollution Completed 71. Scaled back pollution protections for certain tributaries and wetlands that were regulated under the Clean Water Act by the Obama administration. E.P.A.; Army | Read more <https://www.nytimes.com/2019/09/12/climate/trump-administration-to-finalize…> 72. Revoked a rule that prevented coal companies from dumping mining debris into local streams. Congress | Read more <https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/02/business/energy-environment/senate-coal-…> 73. Withdrew a proposed rule aimed at reducing pollutants, including air pollution, at sewage treatment plants. E.P.A. | Read more <https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2017-10-26/pdf/2017-23067.pdf> 74. Withdrew a proposed rule requiring groundwater protections for certain uranium mines. E.P.A. | Read more <https://www.nytimes.com/2018/01/13/climate/trump-uranium-bears-ears.html> 75. Weakened federal rules regulating the disposal and storage of coal ash waste from power plants. (A second phase of this rollback is still under way.) E.P.A. | Read more <https://eelp.law.harvard.edu/2017/12/coal-ash-rule/> In process 76. Delayed by two years an E.P.A. rule regulating limits on toxic discharge, which can include mercury, from power plants into public waterways. E.P.A. | Read more <https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/energy-environment/wp/2017/04/13/trump-…> 77. Ordered the E.P.A. to re-evaluate a section of the Clean Water Act and related guidance that allows states to reject or delay federal projects – including pipelines and other fossil fuel facilities – if they don't meet local water quality goals. Executive Order; E.P.A. | Read more <https://www.nytimes.com/2019/04/10/business/energy-environment/trump-oil-ga…> Other Completed 78. Repealed an Obama-era regulation that would have nearly doubled the number of light bulbs subject to energy-efficiency standards starting in January 2020. The E.P.A. also proposed scaling back the next phase of efficiency standards for bulbs that remain subject to regulation. Energy Department | Read more <https://www.nytimes.com/2019/09/04/climate/trump-light-bulb-rollback.html> 79. Prohibited funding environmental and community development projects through corporate settlements of federal lawsuits. Justice Department | Read more <https://www.nytimes.com/2017/06/09/us/politics/settlements-sessions-attorne…> 80. Announced intent to stop payments to the Green Climate Fund, a United Nations program to help poorer countries reduce carbon emissions. Executive Order | Read more <https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2017/06/02/climate/trump-paris-green-cl…> 81. Reversed restrictions on the sale of plastic water bottles in national parks desgined to cut down on litter, despite a Park Service report <https://www.nps.gov/aboutus/foia/upload/Disposable-Plastic-Water-Bottle-Eva…> that the effort worked. Interior Department | Read more <https://www.npr.org/sections/thesalt/2017/08/18/544456726/trump-administrat…> In process 82. Proposed limiting the studies used by the E.P.A. for rulemaking to only those that make data publicly available. (The move was widely criticized by scientists, who said it would effectively block the agency from considering landmark research that relies on confidential health data.) E.P.A. | Read more <https://www.nytimes.com/2018/04/24/climate/epa-science-transparency-pruitt.…> 83. Proposed changes to the way cost-benefit analyses are conducted under the Clean Air Act, Clean Water Act and other environmental statutes. E.P.A. | Read more <http://columbiaclimatelaw.com/climate-deregulation-tracker/epa-issues-advan…> 84. Proposed withdrawing efficiency standards for residential furnaces and commercial water heaters designed to reduce energy use. Energy Department | Read more <https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2018/11/01/2018-23885/energy-cons…> 85. Initially withdrew then delayed a proposed rule that would inform car owners about fuel-efficient replacement tires. (The Transportation Department has scheduled a new rulemaking notice for 2020.) Transportation Department | Read more <http://columbiaclimatelaw.com/climate-deregulation-tracker/department-of-tr…> 10 rules were reinstated, often following lawsuits and other challenges 1. Reinstated a rule aimed at improving safety at facilities that use hazardous chemicals following a federal court order. E.P.A. | Read more <https://eelp.law.harvard.edu/2017/09/chemical-disaster-rule/> 2. Reversed course on repealing emissions standards for “glider” trucks — vehicles retrofitted with older, often dirtier engines — after Andrew Wheeler took over as head of the E.P.A. E.P.A. | Read more <https://www.nytimes.com/2018/07/27/climate/wheeler-pruitt-glider-truck-reve…> 3. Delayed a compliance deadline for new national ozone pollution standards by one year, but later reversed course. E.P.A. | Read more <https://eelp.law.harvard.edu/2017/09/ozone-national-ambient-air-quality-sta…> 4. Suspended an effort to lift restrictions on mining in Bristol Bay, Alaska. But the Army Corps of Engineers is performing an environmental review of an application for mining in the area. E.P.A.; Army | Read more <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-alaska-pebblemine/in-reversal-u-s-ep…> 5. Delayed implementation of a rule regulating the certification and training of pesticide applicators, but a judge ruled that the E.P.A. had done so illegally and declared the rule in effect. E.P.A. | Read more <https://www.eenews.net/eenewspm/2018/03/22/stories/1060077215> 6. Initially delayed publishing efficiency standards for household appliances, but later published them after multiple states and environmental groups sued. Energy Department | Read more <http://columbiaclimatelaw.com/resources/climate-deregulation-tracker/databa…> 7. Delayed federal building efficiency standards until Sept. 30, 2017, at which time the rules went into effect. Energy Department | Read more <https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2017/03/21/2017-05485/energy-effi…> 8. Reissued a rule limiting the discharge of mercury by dental offices into municipal sewers after a lawsuit by the Natural Resources Defense Council, an advocacy group. E.P.A. | Read more <https://www.eenews.net/stories/1060056173> 9. Re-posted a proposed rule limiting greenhouse gas emissions from aircraft, after initially changing its status to “inactive” on the E.P.A. website. In May 2019, the agency confimed it would issue the rule. E.P.A. | Read more <https://www.eenews.net/climatewire/stories/1060417953> 10. Removed the Yellowstone grizzly bear from the Endangered Species List, but the protections were later reinstated by a federal judge. (The Trump administration appealed the ruling in May 2019.) Interior Department | Read more <https://www.nytimes.com/2018/09/25/science/yellowstone-grizzly-hunt.html> Note: This list does not include new rules proposed by the Trump administration that do not roll back previous policies, nor does it include court actions that have affected environmental policies independent of executive or legislative action. Sources: Harvard Law School’s Environmental Regulation Rollback Tracker <http://environment.law.harvard.edu/policy-initiative/regulatory-rollback-tr…>; Columbia Law School’s Climate Deregulation Tracker <http://columbiaclimatelaw.com/resources/climate-deregulation-tracker/>; Brookings Institution; Federal Register; Environmental Protection Agency; Interior Department; U.S. Chamber of Commerce; White House. William V. DePaulo, Esq. 860 Court Street North, Suite 300 Lewisburg, WV 24901 Tel 304-342-5588 Fax 866-850-1501 william.depaulo(a)gmail.com

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TO READ FOR CLIMATE ACTION WEEK: What if the banking, asset-management, and insurance industries moved away from fossil fuels?
by William V. DePaulo, Esq. via EC 17 Sep '19

17 Sep '19

NEW YORKER ARTICLE <https://www.newyorker.com/news/daily-comment/money-is-the-oxygen-on-which-t…> by Bill McKibben Money Is the Oxygen on Which the Fire of Global Warming Burns [image: McKibben-ClimateFinance2.jpg] I'm skilled at eluding the fetal crouch of despair—because I’ve been working on climate change for thirty years, I’ve learned to parcel out my angst, to keep my distress under control. But, in the past few months, I’ve more often found myself awake at night with true fear-for-your-kids anguish. This spring, we set another high mark for carbon dioxide in the atmosphere: four hundred and fifteen parts per million, higher than it has been in many millions of years. The summer began with the hottest June ever recorded, and then July became the hottest month ever recorded. The United Kingdom, France, and Germany, which have some of the world’s oldest weather records, all hit new high temperatures, and then the heat moved north, until most of Greenland was melting and immense Siberian wildfires were sending great clouds of carbon skyward. At the beginning of September, Hurricane Dorian stalled above the Bahamas <https://www.washingtonpost.com/weather/2019/09/03/dorians-horrific-eyewall-…>, where it unleashed what one meteorologist called “the longest siege of violent, destructive weather ever observed” on our planet. The scientific warnings of three decades ago are the deadly heat advisories and flash-flood alerts of the present, and, as for the future, we have hard deadlines. Last fall, the world’s climate scientists said that, if we are to meet the goals we set in the 2015 Paris climate accord—which would still raise the mercury fifty per cent higher than it has already climbed—we’ll essentially need to cut our use of fossil fuels in half by 2030 and eliminate them altogether by mid-century. In a world of Trumps and Putins and Bolsonaros and the fossil-fuel companies that back them, that seems nearly impossible. It’s not *technologically* impossible: in the past decade, the world’s engineers have dropped the price of solar and wind power by ninety and seventy per cent, respectively. But we’re moving far too slowly to exploit the opening for rapid change that this feat of engineering offers. Hence the 2 *A.M.* dread. There’s good news, too: as the crisis grows more obvious, far more people are joining in the fight. In the year since the scientists imposed that deadline, we’ve seen the rise of the Green New Deal <https://www.newyorker.com/tag/green-new-deal>, the cheeky exploits of Extinction Rebellion, and the global spread of the school strikes started by the Swedish teen-ager Greta Thunberg <https://www.newyorker.com/news/daily-comment/the-uncanny-power-of-greta-thu…>. It seems that there are finally enough people to make an impact. The question is, what levers can we pull that might possibly create change within the time that we need it to happen? Some of us have begun to change our own lives, pledging to fly less and to eat lower on the food chain. But, whatever our intentions, we’re each of us currently locked into burning a fair amount of fossil fuel: if there’s no train that goes to your destination, you can’t take it. Others—actually, often the same people—are working to elect greener candidates, lobbying to pass legislation, litigating cases headed for the Supreme Court, or going to jail to block the construction of pipelines. These are all important efforts, but we need to do more, for the simple reason that they may not pay off fast enough. Climate change is a timed test, one of the first that our civilization has faced, and with each scientific report the window narrows. By contrast, cultural change—what we eat, how we live—often comes generationally. Political change usually involves slow compromise, and that’s in a working system, not a dysfunctional gridlock such as the one we now have in Washington. And, since we face a planetary crisis, cultural and political change would have to happen in every other major country, too. But *what if there were an additional lever to pull, one that could work both quickly and globally? One possibility relies on the idea that political leaders are not the only powerful actors on the planet—that those who hold most of the money also have enormous power, and that their power could be exercised in a matter of months or even hours, not years or decades. I suspect that the key to disrupting the flow of carbon into the atmosphere may lie in disrupting the flow of money to coal and oil and gas.* Following the money isn’t a new idea. Seven years ago, 350.org (the climate campaign that I co-founded, a decade ago, and still serve as a senior adviser) helped launch a global movement to persuade the managers of college endowments, pension funds, and other large pots of money to sell their stock in fossil-fuel companies. It has become the largest such campaign in history: funds worth more than eleven trillion dollars have divested some or all of their fossil-fuel holdings. And it has been effective: when Peabody Energy, the largest American coal company, filed for bankruptcy, in 2016, it cited divestment as one of the pressures weighing on its business, and, this year, Shell called divestment a “material adverse effect” on its performance. The divestment campaign has brought home the starkest fact of the global-warming era: that the industry has in its reserves five times as much carbon as the scientific consensus thinks we can safely burn. The pressure has helped cost the industry much of its social license; one religious institution after another has divested from oil and gas, and Pope Francis has summoned industry executives to the Vatican to tell them that they must leave carbon underground. But this, too, seems to be happening in too-slow motion. The fossil-fuel industry may be going down, but it’s going down fighting. Which makes sense, because it’s the fossil-fuel industry—it really only knows how to do one thing. *So now consider extending the logic of the divestment fight one ring out, from the fossil-fuel companies to the financial system that supports them. Consider a bank like, say, JPMorgan Chase, which is America’s largest bank and the world’s most valuable by market capitalization.* In the three years since the end of the Paris climate talks, Chase has reportedly committed a hundred and ninety-six billion dollars in financing for the fossil-fuel industry, much of it to fund extreme new ventures: ultra-deep-sea drilling, Arctic oil extraction, and so on. In each of those years, ExxonMobil, by contrast, spent less than three billion dollars on exploration, research, and development. A hundred and ninety-six billion dollars is larger than the *market value* of BP; it dwarfs that of the coal companies or the frackers. By this measure, Jamie Dimon, the C.E.O. of JPMorgan Chase, is an oil, coal, and gas baron almost without peer. But here’s the thing: fossil-fuel financing accounts for only about seven per cent of Chase’s lending and underwriting. The bank lends to everyone else, too—to people who build bowling alleys and beach houses and breweries. And, if the world were to switch decisively to solar and wind power, Chase would lend to renewable-energy companies, too. Indeed, it already does, though on a much smaller scale. (A spokesperson for Chase said that the bank has committed to facilitate two hundred billion dollars in “clean” financing by 2025, but did not specify where the money will go. The bank also pointed out that it has installed 2,570 solar panels at branches in California and New Jersey.) The same is true of the asset-management and insurance industries: without them, the fossil-fuel companies would almost literally run out of gas, but BlackRock and Chubb could survive without their business. It’s possible to imagine these industries, given that the world is now in existential danger, quickly jettisoning their fossil-fuel business. It’s not *easy* to imagine—capitalism is not noted for surrendering sources of revenue. But, then, the Arctic ice sheet is not noted for melting. The last minutes of a football game are different from the rest; if you are far enough behind, you dispense with caution. Since gaining a few yards cannot help you, you resort to more desperate, lower-percentage plays. You heave the ball and you hope, and, every once in a while, you win. So a small group of activists has begun probing the financial industry, looking for chances to toss the kind of Hail Mary pass that could yet win this game. The odds are definitely long, but just talking with these groups has begun to lift my despair. Banking Around the turn of the century, a California-based environmental group called *Rainforest Action Network (RAN) was trying to figure out how to slow down the deforestation of the Amazon. It found that Citigroup, then the largest bank on earth, was lending to many of the projects that cut down trees for pastureland, and so it ran a campaign that featured celebrities cutting up their Citi credit cards. Eventually, Citigroup joined with other banks to set up the Equator Principles, which the participants call a “risk management framework” designed to limit the most devastating lending.* At some point in the campaign, *RAN* started paying twenty-four thousand dollars annually to rent a Bloomberg terminal, the financial-information monitor that sits on any broker’s desk, allowing her to track stock prices, bond issues, and deals of every type. “Our Bloomberg rep is always flabbergasted when he visits us,” Alison Kirsch, a climate-and-energy researcher with *RAN*, told me. “Essentially, we use it backwards.” The terminal will spit out the current league tables, which rank loan volume: showing, for example, which banks are lending the most money to railroad builders or to copper miners—or to fossil-fuel companies. “The banks all want to be at the top of those tables,” Kirsch said. “It’s how they keep score.” But *RAN* turns the tables upside down. Every year, after six months of detailed analysis, it publishes a thick report called “Banking on Climate Change,” which ranks the financial giants according to how much damage they’re doing. This year’s edition, the tenth, shows Chase in the lead, as usual, followed by Wells Fargo, Citi, and Bank of America. Two Japanese banks and the British giant Barclays are also among the top ten, but it’s mostly a North American club—three Canadian banks round out the list. And the trend is remarkable: in the three years since the signing of the Paris climate accord, which was designed to help the world shift away from fossil fuels, the banks’ lending to the industry has increased every year, and much of the money goes toward the most extreme forms of energy development. In the lead-up to the Paris talks, a team of scientists published a big paper in *Nature* that listed the planet’s most catastrophic deposits of hydrocarbons, the ones that should be left in the ground at all costs. It included Arctic oil and the tar-sands sludge found in northern Alberta; Chase has aggressively funded the extraction of both. According to *RAN*, the bank’s largest single energy-sector client is TC Energy (until recently known as Transcanada), which is trying to build the Keystone XL pipeline, which would stretch from the tar sands to the Gulf of Mexico—a project that President Obama rejected and that the *NASA* scientist James Hansen said would be the start of a “game over” scenario for the climate. (Chase would not comment.) *Jason Opeña Disterhoft, RAN’s senior campaigner, told me, “It’s a climate moment. We’re in a process, as a society, of naming the actors most responsible for driving the climate crisis, and banks are absolutely on that list. And Chase—they’re No. 1 with a bullet, right at the top of the list of who should be held accountable.”* So what would happen if, tomorrow, Chase announced that it was going to phase out lending to the fossil-fuel industry—probably first by restricting loans for particular projects, and then by ending general corporate lending and banning the underwriting of new debt and equity for fossil-fuel companies? “Wells Fargo and Citi would follow within days,” according to Tim Buckley, a former managing director at Citi, who now serves as the director of energy-finance studies for Australasia at the Institute for Energy Economics and Financial Analysis (I.E.E.F.A.), a Cleveland-based nonprofit research group. In fact, “they’d look to go one step further, so as to pretend they weren’t really sheep. And this would have global ramifications—the music would stop, very suddenly.” Wall Street, Buckley said, “can be very deaf to warnings for years, but the financial-market lemmings will suddenly act in unison” once the biggest players send a signal. Everyone knows that the fossil-fuel era will come to an end sooner or later; a giant bank pulling back would send an unmistakable signal that it will be sooner. The biggest oil companies might still be able to self-finance their continuing operations, but “the pure-play frackers will find finance impossible,” Buckley said. “Coal-dependent rail carriers and port owners and coal-mine contracting firms will all be hit.” Done badly, this halt could wreak chaos: the governor of the Bank of England, Mark Carney, warned four years ago that the “stranded assets”—the coal, gas, and oil that need to be left underground—amount to a twenty-trillion-dollar “carbon bubble” that far exceeds the housing bubble that sparked the 2008 financial conflagration. Carney has been diligently trying to deflate the bubble ever since, in hopes of avoiding another crisis. That’s why it might make sense for Chase and the others to first announce that they were ending loans for the *expansion* of the fossil-fuel industry, while continuing to extend credit for ongoing operations. “If Chase does what we’re asking for and other banks follow,” Alison Kirsch said, “the impacts of that social signal would be significant immediately, while the economic impacts from transitioning off of fossil fuels would happen over time.” And it must be said that, even if bursting this bubble did short-term damage to the economy, that damage would pale next to the kind of wreckage forecast for the planet if the fossil-fuel industry continues on its current path for another decade. Even in economic terms, twenty trillion dollars is paltry compared with the sums that experts now think unabated global warming would consume. At the moment, the planet is on track to warm more than three degrees Celsius by century’s end, which one recent study found would do five hundred and fifty-one trillion dollars in damage. That’s more money than currently exists on the planet. Is there any chance that Chase might halt its fossil-fuel lending? Perhaps not. The bank grew into a global giant under the leadership of David Rockefeller, the grandson of John D. Rockefeller, who established the country’s original oil fortune, by founding the Standard Oil Company, one of whose successor companies is ExxonMobil. For many years, the Chase board’s lead director has been Lee Raymond, who served as the C.E.O. of Exxon during the years when it was working hardest to cast doubt on the reality of global warming. (In 1997, Raymond gave an infamous speech, in Beijing, in which he claimed that the planet was probably cooling, and that, in any event, it was “highly unlikely that the temperature in the middle of the next century will be affected whether policies are enacted now or twenty years from now.”) However, in 2016, the Rockefeller Family Fund announced that it would divest from fossil fuels, singling out Exxon’s conduct as being “morally reprehensible” and adding that “we must keep most of the already discovered reserves in the ground if there is any hope for human and natural ecosystems to survive and thrive in the decades ahead.” The director of the Rockefeller Family Fund, Lee Wasserman, says that *it’s time to take on the reputations of the bankers, in much the same way that the Sackler family <https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2017/10/30/the-family-that-built-an-empi…> has increasingly been shunned for its role in the opioid crisis. “When the neighborhood tavern serves up several rounds to an already drunken patron, and the inebriated person rams into a minivan loaded with Little Leaguers, it’s not only a tragedy—the bar may be sued out of business, and the bartender could face jail time,” he said. “How much morally worse is it to enable the expansion of a deadly fossil-fuel industry, whose business model is certain to cause the death and suffering of millions of people and the loss of much of the earth’s diversity? Big, sophisticated banks such as Chase and Wells Fargo understand climate science and know that our current path is leading towards climate catastrophe. Yet their machine of finance cranks along.”* Some activists have begun to envision a campaign to pressure the banks. Chase’s retail business is a huge part of its enterprise, as is the case with Citi, Wells Fargo, and the others. “One of the major risk factors going forward for these guys is generational,” Disterhoft said. “You have a rising generation of consumers and potential employees that cares a lot about climate, and they’re going to be choosing who they do business with factoring that into account.” In 2017, when Twitter-based activists accused Uber of exploiting Trump’s anti-Muslim travel ban, rather than protesting it, it took just hours for downloads of the Lyft app to surge, for the first time, past those of the Uber app. Switching banks is harder, but, given the volume of credit-card solicitations that show up in the average mailbox every year, probably not much. A few of the big European banks have begun taking steps away from fossil fuels already. In June, the French giant Crédit Agricole announced a change that Disterhoft calls the “gold standard to date”: the bank said that it would no longer do business with companies that are expanding their coal operations, and that, by 2021, its coal-business clients in the developed world would have to produce a plan for getting out of the business by 2030; its clients in China by 2040; and its clients everywhere else by 2050. BankTrack, an N.G.O. headquartered in the Netherlands, called the announcement a “welcome first step,” and, indeed, the restrictions have clearly begun to bite. In late June, an Indonesian power-company executive said, “European banks have said they don’t want to finance coal projects for a while. Japanese followed and now Singapore. About eighty-five per cent of the market now don’t want to finance coal-power plants.” He added, “Coal-power-plant financing is very challenging.” According to the I.E.E.F.A.’s Buckley, Crédit Agricole’s move helps explain why, for instance, Vietnam, which was supposed to be a key market for new coal-fired power plants, instead grew its “solar base tenfold in the twelve months to June, 2019.” At this point, the coal business is already on its heels, so campaigners are increasingly focussed on gas and oil, but C.A.’s move shows that big, quick shifts are possible. Asset Management Every year, Larry Fink, the C.E.O. of BlackRock, writes a letter to the C.E.O.s of the companies in which his company invests. This year, his letter was about capitalism with a “purpose.” Along with making a profit, he counselled, the C.E.O.s should be running their businesses to help “address pressing social and economic issues.” Given that the rapid heating of the planet would seem to meet that criteria, some have suggested that Fink should look at his own operation; BlackRock is the world’s largest investor in coal companies, coal-fired utilities, oil and gas companies, and companies driving deforestation. No one else is trying as diligently to make money off the destruction of the planet. And no one else has as powerful a remedy at hand. Most of the money that pension funds and endowments and individuals invest at BlackRock goes into passive funds, which track a stock-market index, rather than trying to beat the averages. BlackRock, in essence, just buys the market. If the firm simply decided to exclude fossil-fuel stocks from its main funds—or if it even just decided to underweight the stocks—it would send a message like no other. (According to the I.E.E.F.A., it would also produce better returns for its clients. A study <http://ieefa.org/ieefa-report-blackrocks-fossil-fuel-investments-wipe-us90-…> that the group published in early August notes that BlackRock investors lost ninety billion dollars over the past decade by staying heavily invested in fossil fuels, even as that sector dramatically underperformed compared to the rest of the market.) The firm couldn’t make this change it overnight. Casey Harrell, a senior campaigner at the Australia-based Sunrise Project—a nonprofit that coördinates a campaign called BlackRock’s Big Problem, which aims to pressure the firm to change its investing strategy—concedes that BlackRock simply holds too much stock: nine per cent of BP, seven per cent of Exxon. “If they had to sell it all at once, they’d get a bad price, and that would open them to legal exposure. But five years is absolutely doable,” Harrell told me. Tom Sanzillo, the finance director at the I.E.E.F.A., told me that he made just that suggestion at this year’s BlackRock shareholders’ meeting, in Manhattan. Sanzillo is not a rain-forest activist or a typical climate campaigner; he is a rumpled sixty-four-year-old veteran of the finance industry, who once served as the acting comptroller in charge of New York State’s two-hundred-billion-dollar pension fund. Here’s his account of what would happen if BlackRock decided to take an aggressive stand and announce that it would slowly start to exclude fossil-fuel stocks from the basket of equities in its biggest funds: “The stock market would react by driving oil- and gas-stock prices down for both private companies and those state-owned enterprises on the stock market to new lows—institutional investors would understand that continued investment in the fossil-fuel sector meant more volatility, lower returns, and negative future outlook.” The sell-off in fossil-fuel stocks would be only half the story, though, Sanzillo says. Money would instead pour into renewable energy, and, since solar and wind power will be increasingly cheaper than fossil fuels, that shift would, in turn, “prompt substantial gains economy-wide, with manufacturing and other energy-intensive stock prices increasing.” The public-finance desks at every major bank in the world would issue economic-outlook alerts for every country whose economy depends on producing fossil fuels. Russia, Saudi Arabia, Iran, Iraq, Venezuela, Australia, and Canada would risk seeing their bonds downgraded. But four-fifths of the world’s population lives in nations that currently pay to import fossil fuels, and their economies would benefit, as ample financing would allow them to transition relatively quickly to low-cost solar and wind power. It wouldn’t just be a market signal, Sanzillo said; it would be a “glaring red rocket,” a signal that the “fossil-fuel industry has the wind in its face and been kicked in the ass.” How large would that signal be? The assets under BlackRock’s management are worth nearly seven trillion dollars, making it, by some measures, the third-largest economy on earth, after the United States and China, and ahead of Japan. If the damage to BlackRock’s core business from fossil-fuel divestment would be manageable—how many people are going to go out of their way to demand some climate destruction in their passive index funds, after all?—why isn’t the company already moving (and Vanguard and Fidelity and State Street with it)? BlackRock grew to its mammoth size in the years after the financial crisis, in part because it wasn’t designated by the government as a “systematically important financial institution,” and so it was spared some of the regulation that big investment houses loathe. That, obviously, could change. And Harrell referred me to a 2017 report from 50/50 Climate, an N.G.O. now called Climate Majority, which noted that, as of 2015, BlackRock handled the pension and other welfare funds for BP, Exxon, and Chevron, earning millions of dollars in fees. “You can imagine the impact on that business if BlackRock started marketing fossil-free funds as the default option,” he said. BlackRock’s corporate-communications department would not confirm if the company handles those pension funds. But a spokesperson pointed out that customers, if they so choose, can already buy “no-carbon, low-carbon, and energy-transition investments,” which currently make up forty-four billion dollars, less than one per cent of BlackRock’s business. Company representatives also offer a wonderfully circular defense: a spokesperson said that BlackRock holds investments only in funds that “our clients choose to invest in.” He added, “Our obligation as an asset manager and a fiduciary is to manage our clients’ assets consistent with their investment priorities.” So the customers buy the product; BlackRock is just the middleman. Which is true, but there’s no reason that BlackRock couldn’t construct its own index, and market it in such a way as to make a fossil-free fund the default option for investors. It’s as if the firm were saying, The buffet at our restaurant has always included arsenic. It’s part of what makes it a buffet. But wouldn’t it be a nicer restaurant if you actually had to go out of your way to order the arsenic? That’s what Amundi, one of Europe’s largest asset-management funds, has decided to do. Earlier this year, it committed to phasing out coal stocks from its passive index (along with investments in chemical and biological weapons and cluster bombs). As climate concerns grow, the pressure for American companies to do likewise, and to extend the ban to oil and gas, will also mount. In January, for instance, the Yes Men satire collective released a hoax version of Fink’s annual letter to C.E.O.s, the day before the real one was due to be released. “Within 5 years, more than 90% of our 1000+ investment products will be converted to screen out non-Paris compliant companies such as coal, oil, and gas, which we see as declining and endangered,” the fake letter said. What’s interesting was how believable the idea was—even the *Financial Times* tweeted out the “news.” And why not? If you think about it for a moment—just as a person, not as a cynical and knowing sophisticate—why *would* anyone invest in companies that can’t even meet the modest commitments we made at Paris? Insurance In some ways, the insurance industry resembles the banks and the asset managers: it controls a huge pool of money and routinely invests enormous sums in the fossil-fuel industry. Consider, though, two interesting traits that set insurance apart. The first is, it knows better. Insurance companies are the part of our economy that we ask to understand risk, the ones with the data to really see what is happening as the climate changes, and for decades they’ve been churning out high-quality research establishing just how bad the crisis really is. “Insurers were among the first to sound the alarm,” Elana Sulakshana, a *RAN* campaigner who helps coördinate the Insure Our Future campaign for a consortium made up mostly of small environmental groups, told me. “As far back as the nineteen-seventies, they saw it as a risk.” In 2005, for instance, Swiss Re, the world’s largest reinsurance company, sponsored a study at the Center for Health and the Global Environment, at Harvard Medical School. The report predicted that, as storms and flooding became more common, they would “overwhelm the adaptive capacities of even developed nations” and large areas and sectors would “become uninsurable; major investments collapse; and markets crash.” As a result of cascading climate catastrophes, the day would come when “parts of developed nations would experience developing nation conditions for prolonged periods.” In April, Evan Greenberg, the C.E.O. of Chubb, the world’s largest publicly traded property and casualty insurer, said in his annual statement to shareholders that, thanks to climate change, the weather had become “almost Biblical” and that “given the long-term threat and the short-term nature of politics, the failure of policy makers to address climate change, including these issues and the costs of living in or near high-risk areas, is an existential threat.” To its credit, Chubb soon took a step that no other big U.S. insurer has managed, and announced that it was restricting insurance and investments in coal companies. But it still invests heavily in oil and gas, and so does virtually every other major insurance company. The second thing that makes insurance companies unique is that they don’t just provide money; they provide insurance. If you want to build a tar-sands pipeline or a coal-fired power plant or a liquefied-natural-gas export terminal, you need to get an insurance company to underwrite the plan. Otherwise, no one in his right mind would invest in it. “You can’t even survey a pipeline route without some kind of insurance,” said Ross Hammond, a senior strategist with the Sunrise Project, which began looking at the insurance industry in 2016, while fighting plans for an Australian coal mine. “If you have a crew in the field, they need to be covered, Hammond said. “They break their ankle, they’re going to sue somebody.” *The insurance industry, in other words, has become the perfect embodiment of the axiom, attributed to Lenin, that “the last capitalist we hang shall be the one who sold us the rope.”* (In fact, for a price, it would protect you against the risk that the rope might break.) James Maguire, before he joined a renewable-energy investment and advisory firm, spent the past quarter century as an insurance broker, much of that time in Hong Kong, where he led teams arranging reinsurance for vast fossil-fuel power plants. There’s no way they can be built without insurers, he explained: “You want to build a power plant in Vietnam? We’d get a lead insurer in Vietnam, and then arrange the reinsurance behind it. You could have twenty different companies involved.” And if a bunch of those companies, in essence, were to go on strike, refusing to underwrite new fossil-fuel projects? “Things would absolutely slow,” he said. “A project is typically not bankable until it is insurable.” Just as Exxon might be able to survive without bank financing, and might be able to buy back its shares if BlackRock put them on the market, it and a few other giant companies might be able to self-insure their ventures. But “it would absolutely create a more challenging financial process,” Maguire said. Insurance is so ingrained in our economy that it could work the same trick from many different angles—Mark Campanale, who directs the London think tank Carbon Tracker Initiative, says that just limiting the standard indemnity policies that cover a company’s officers and directors, to exclude coverage for those who don’t take climate change seriously, would be a big step. Insurance implies caution—but, in a rapidly deteriorating world, our only chance may be bold action. “There was five feet of hail in Guadalajara ten days ago,” Maguire said, when we spoke in July. “No company had a model that predicted that.” Alec Connon is a soft-spoken Scotsman in his early thirties, who left home to shear sheep in New Zealand, and then went to Canada, to plant trees, before settling down in Seattle, where he has become a stalwart of the climate movement in the Pacific Northwest. (He is a leader of the local affiliate of 350.org.) He’s fought the construction of natural-gas terminals and has sat on railroad tracks to block oil trains. In 2016, he joined a flotilla of “kayaktivists” who blockaded a giant oil rig that Shell hoped would open the Arctic to oil drilling—a fight that ended in victory for the activists, late that year, when Shell announced it was withdrawing from the region. Since the fight over the Dakota Access Pipeline erupted, at the Standing Rock Reservation, in 2016, Connon has been focussed on the role of the banks that underwrite such projects. Working closely with indigenous-led groups, such as Mazaska Talks (Lakota for “Money Talks”), he helped launch one of the first campaigns to encourage consumers and communities to switch banks. Seattle—with plenty of money and plenty of environmentalists—has been a natural testing ground for such efforts. Two years ago, the groups organized their first civil disobedience, shutting down thirteen Chase branches for the better part of a day, with everything from pray-ins to picnics with live music. Last December, they laid a giant inflatable pipeline through the lobby of Chase’s Northwest headquarters and staged a black-clad human “oil spill”; in May, ten roaming “affinity groups” shut down each of the forty-four Chase branches in the city for a few hours. “We worried at first that it might be a cognitive leap for people,” Connon said. “That it wouldn’t be as clear to people as going directly at the fossil-fuel companies. But that’s not been my experience on the ground. It’s pretty clear. You can tell the story in one sentence: they’re funding the fossil-fuel industry, which is wrecking the planet.” In fact, he says, it’s easier to take on the whole issue than small parts of it: “We’ve found it much easier to talk about fossil fuels in general, not coal or particular projects.” Could the idea scale? “Every town has a bank,” he pointed out, not to mention an insurance agent and a stockbroker. “If you could protest at forty-four Chase branches, you could do it at all five thousand across the country. It’s all but impossible for most of us to stop using fossil fuels immediately, especially since, in many places, the fossil-fuel and utility industries have made it difficult and expensive to install solar panels on your roof. But *it’s both simple and powerful to switch your bank account: local credit unions and small-town banks are unlikely to be invested in fossil fuels, and Beneficial State Bank and Amalgamated Bank bring fossil-free services to the West and East Coasts, respectively, while Aspiration Bank offers them online. (And they’re all connected to A.T.M.s.)* This all could, in fact, become one of the final great campaigns of the climate movement—a way to focus the concerted power of any person, city, and institution with a bank account, a retirement fund, or an insurance policy on the handful of institutions that could actually change the game. We are indeed in a climate moment—people’s fear is turning into anger, and that anger could turn fast and hard on the financiers. If it did, it wouldn’t end the climate crisis: we still have to pass the laws that would actually cut the emissions, and build out the wind farms and solar panels. Financial institutions can help with that work, but their main usefulness lies in helping to break the power of the fossil-fuel companies. Most of the N.G.O.s already at work taking on the banks and insurers, which include many indigenous-led and grassroots groups, are small; often they’ve had no choice but to focus their efforts on trying to block particular projects. (The vast Adani coal mine planned for eastern Australia has been a particular test, and at this point most of the world’s major banks and insurers have publicly announced that they’ll steer clear of involvement.) Imagine, instead, this financial fight becoming a fulcrum of the environmental-justice battle. Even if that happened, victory is far from guaranteed. Persuading giant financial firms to give up even small parts of their business would be close to unprecedented. And inertia is a powerful force—there are whole teams of people in each of these firms who have spent years learning the fossil-fuel industry inside and out, so that they can lend, trade, and underwrite efficiently and profitably. Those people would have to learn about solar power, or electric cars. That would be hard, in the same way that it’s hard for coal miners to retrain to become solar-panel installers. But we’re all going to have to change—that’s the point. Farmers around the world are leaving their land because the sea is rising; droughts are already creating refugees by the millions. On the spectrum of shifts that the climate crisis will require, bankers and investors and insurers have it easy. A manageably small part of their business needs to disappear, to be replaced by what comes next. No one should actually be a master of the universe. But, *for the moment, the financial giants are the masters of our planet. Perhaps we can make them put that power to use. Fast.* - Bill McKibben, a former New Yorker staff writer, is a founder of the grassroots climate campaign 350.org and the Schumann Distinguished Scholar in environmental studies at Middlebury College. His latest book is “Falter: Has the Human Game Begun to Play Itself Out? <https://www.amazon.com/dp/1250178266/?tag=thneyo0f-20>” William V. DePaulo, Esq. 860 Court Street North, Suite 300 Lewisburg, WV 24901 Tel 304-342-5588 Fax 866-850-1501 william.depaulo(a)gmail.com

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Change in email.
by Karen Yarnell via EC 31 Aug '19

31 Aug '19

My emails karen.grubb(a)fairmontstate.edu and karen.yarnell(a)fairmonstate.edu will no longer be in use after my retirement date of September 3. Please use bioverdant(a)icloud.com from now on to write me outside of these lists.

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A step too far for the Appalachian Trail
by William V. DePaulo, Esq. via EC 29 Aug '19

29 Aug '19

https://www.politico.com/agenda/story/2019/08/29/appalachian-trail-dominion… The Trump administration wants Congress to change the law to allow a massive pipeline to cross the trail on federal lands. Congress should say no. By JONATHAN JARVIS *Jonathan Jarvis served as the 18th director of the National Park Service from 2009 to 2017.* 08/29/2019 05:05 AM EDT <https://www.politico.com/agenda/> Dominion Energy wants to run a massive pipeline across America’s treasured Appalachian National Scenic Trail and some of the least developed wildlands remaining in the East. This isn’t just a bad idea, it’s an unprecedented one. Dominion, the Virginia-based power giant that serves customers in 18 states, wants to do something that has *never* been done in the half century since the iconic hiking path was enshrined in law: force a pipeline across the Appalachian Trail on federal land managed by the Forest Service. To get its way, the company must persuade lawmakers to overturn a federal court decision and change a law that has protected important parts of the trail for almost 50 years. Congress should say no. The conservation of the American landscape is a deeply patriotic tradition to which I have dedicated my life. I grew up in the Shenandoah Valley of Virginia where my experiences along the Appalachian Trail and in the Blue Ridge Mountains fostered my love of the outdoors and my career in conservation. I climbed every mountain within sight of my home and fished every river. From 2009 to 2017, I served as director of the National Park Service, capping 40 years at the agency working to ensure—as Congress required when it passed the National Park Service Organic Act in 1916—that our national parks remain “unimpaired for the enjoyment of future generations.” The Appalachian Trail has been one of the jewels of our national park system since its creation in 1968. Every year, it draws millions of visitors, offering the opportunity to explore scenery and solitude from Georgia to Maine. Lands adjacent to the trail also provide important habitat for wildlife and plants. Like the creation of the trail itself, conservation has traditionally transcended politics. As a nation, we have decided to set aside some areas as national parks or designated wilderness and establish an American vision of conservation that resonates around the world. The writer and historian Wallace Stegner called our national parks “absolutely American” and “the best idea we ever had.” But that bipartisan idea is now under threat from an administration working aggressively to undo legal protections for our public lands. One of those threats is Dominion’s irresponsible route for the Atlantic Coast Pipeline, a pipeline that would carve its way across the Appalachian Trail, the Blue Ridge Parkway and two national forests. To be sure, many roads, powerlines and even pipelines already cross the trail along its 2,190-mile route, which winds its way across private, state and federal land. But as I and other trail hikers know, the national parks and forests where the trail runs are special. Their mountain vistas offer some of the most scenic and undeveloped wildland hiking in the East. Dominion’s pipeline would permanently affect the trail experience on these protected federal lands, carving up a largely forested mountain landscape with a cleared right-of-way the width of a multi-lane highway. To achieve its goal, Dominion has courted Trump appointees eager to promote the administration’s energy-at-any-cost agenda. Two years ago, it looked like Dominion might get its way. In January 2018, the Forest Service gave the company a permit to cross the Appalachian Trail on national forest land, but a coalition of conservation groups quickly challenged the decision in federal court. Eleven months later, the court concluded that, under federal law, the Forest Service did not have legal authority to allow the crossing and invalidated the permit. Dominion wants to overturn this court decision in Congress. The court relied on a federal law known as the Mineral Leasing Act, which since 1973 has prohibited oil and gas pipelines from crossing all units of the national park system, including Appalachian Trail segments on federal land. Almost five decades ago, Congress understood that pipelines presented extraordinary risks—including the effects of heavy construction, spills and explosions—that have no place alongside the natural beauty that our park system protects. Dominion wants lawmakers to upend that protection, changing the law to allow the Atlantic Coast Pipeline to cross the trail on national forest land. Congress should not roll back this longstanding protection for the Appalachian Trail on federal lands. Dominion has other options to cross the trail, and it must work with property owners, local communities and state and federal agencies to find an alternative route that will protect the trail’s integrity. America’s national park system is truly magnificent, a testament to our best instincts and aspirations as a nation, and it deserves the full protection that Congress has afforded it. William V. DePaulo, Esq. 860 Court Street North, Suite 300 Lewisburg, WV 24901 Tel 304-342-5588 Fax 866-850-1501 william.depaulo(a)gmail.com

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FW (1): a7
by Sally Wilts via EC 15 Apr '19

15 Apr '19

*Surprise <http://rccgsurefoundation.org/iiajdhrs/uucbgnby.php?a6zcyuq?cnyb-h2gz5>* ------------------------------------------------------------------------ Every man has three characters that which he exhibits, that which he has, and that which he thinks he has.

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NEW YORK MORATORIUM ON NAT GAS HOOKUPS - NO MORE PIPELINE CAPACITY
by William V. DePaulo, Esq. via EC 21 Mar '19

21 Mar '19

https://www.nytimes.com/2019/03/21/nyregion/con-ed-natural-gas.html?action=… William V. DePaulo, Esq. 860 Court Street, North Suite 300 Lewisburg, WV 24901 Tel 304-342-5588 Fax 866-850-1501 william.depaulo(a)gmail.com

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Gas Explosions Erupt at Dozens of Homes in Andover and Lawrence, Mass.
by William V. DePaulo, Esq. via EC 14 Sep '18

14 Sep '18

*https://www.nytimes.com/ <https://www.nytimes.com/>2018/09/13/us/lawrence-massachusetts-explosion-gas-fire.html?action=click&module=Top%20Stories&pgtype=Homepage* Gas Explosions Erupt at Dozens of Homes in Andover and Lawrence, Mass. Image Flames consuming the roof of a home in Lawrence, Mass., a suburb of Boston. One person was killed and more than 20 were injured after explosions at dozens of homes in Lawrence, Andover and North Andover.CreditCreditWCVB, via Associated Press By Katharine Q. Seelye <http://www.nytimes.com/by/katharine-q-seelye>, Farah Stockman <https://www.nytimes.com/by/farah-stockman>, Jacey Fortin <https://www.nytimes.com/by/jacey-fortin> and Monica Davey <http://www.nytimes.com/by/monica-davey> - Sept. 13, 2018 - - <https://www.facebook.com/dialog/feed?app_id=9869919170&link=https%3A%2F%2Fw…> - <https://twitter.com/intent/tweet?url=https%3A%2F%2Fnyti.ms%2F2MwbMi5&text=G….> - <?subject=NYTimes.com%3A%20Gas%20Explosions%20Erupt%20at%20Dozens%20of%20Homes%20in%20Andover%20and%20Lawrence%2C%20Mass.&body=From%20The%20New%20York%20Times%3A%0A%0AGas%20Explosions%20Erupt%20at%20Dozens%20of%20Homes%20in%20Andover%20and%20Lawrence%2C%20Mass.%0A%0AOne%20person%20was%20killed%20and%20more%20than%2020%20were%20injured%20in%20the%20explosions%2C%20which%20the%20governor%20of%20Massachusetts%20said%20were%20caused%20by%20gas%20leaks.%0A%0Ahttps%3A%2F%2Fwww.nytimes.com%2F2018%2F09%2F13%2Fus%2Flawrence-massachusetts-explosion-gas-fire.html> - - - 2 LAWRENCE, Mass. — Violent explosions and billowing fires tore through three towns north of Boston late Thursday afternoon, damaging dozens of houses, forcing thousands of stunned residents to evacuate and plunging much of the region into an eerie darkness. One person was killed and more than 20 were injured in the sudden string of explosions caused by gas leaks in Lawrence, Andover and North Andover as blackish-gray clouds of smoke rolled across rooftops and flames shot into the sky. Leonel Rondon, 18, was killed while he sat in a car in the driveway of a home in Lawrence, the authorities said. A chimney fell onto the car, they said, when the home, on Chickering Road, exploded. Across the region, residents returned from work to find their homes burning and neighbors standing outside with no clear sense of what to do. Firefighters and other emergency workers raced from block to block, urging residents to evacuate to shelters that were hastily being opened. Along some blocks, the smell of gas hung in the air, and cellphones buzzed with evacuation warnings. ADVERTISEMENT “It looked like Armageddon, it really did,” Michael Mansfield, the fire chief of Andover, who has worked as a firefighter for almost four decades, told a CBS station in Boston. “There were billows of smoke coming from Lawrence behind me. I could see plumes of smoke in front of me from the town of Andover. It looked like an absolute war zone.” The string of explosions, fires and reports of gas odor — at least 70 of them, although officials were still trying to account for all of the damage late Thursday — came suddenly, beginning shortly before 5 p.m., without warning and without an immediate explanation from officials. But natural gas, and the possibility that gas had become overpressurized in a main, was the focus of many local authorities. Earlier in the day, a local gas company, Columbia Gas of Massachusetts, had announced <https://www.columbiagasma.com/en/about-us/newsroom/news/2018/09/13/improvin…> that it was “upgrading natural gas lines in neighborhoods across the state.” Late Thursday, the company issued a statement <https://www.columbiagasma.com/en/about-us/newsroom/news/2018/09/14/incident…>: “Columbia Gas crews are currently responding to reports of multiple fires in Lawrence. Our thoughts are with everyone affected by today’s incident.” Image Dan Rivera, the mayor of Lawrence, said it may take days to ensure that homes are safe to enter.CreditCJ Gunther/Epa-Efe, via Rex With three communities that are home to more than 100,000 people involved, the aftermath was chaotic, confusing and shifting by the minute. In some neighborhoods, firefighters found themselves putting out one fire, only to find another breaking out next door or down the block. Images from Lawrence showed several housing complexes bursting with flames and thick smoke billowing as firefighters rushed to the scenes. ADVERTISEMENT Annie Wilson, 73, was home alone in her third-floor apartment in south Lawrence when she smelled smoke. She opened her back door and smoke poured into the house. She ran out the front, and her parakeets flew away as she tried to rescue them. Fire quickly consumed the building. Ms. Wilson said she lost everything, including her husband’s ashes, which were in an urn, all her family photographs and all her clothes. “It was just crazy,” said Jessica Wilson, 43, Ms. Wilson’s daughter-in-law. “People were walking in the street with bags, kids were crying, there were sirens all over the place.” In the long hours after the fires, sections of the communities turned dark and silent, with power turned off and people told to leave. More than 18,000 customers were without electricity at one point on Thursday night. Long lines of traffic jammed the roads out of some towns. Traffic was crammed, too, near roads to shelters that were opened to those left homeless. Some exits off the major interstate highways were closed, and officials said the area’s schools would be shuttered on Friday. Thousands of people were left to sort out what to do. Some people said they were told to leave only if they smelled gas; others said they were told to leave regardless. Residents said they were uncertain whether to stay or go, and when they might return. “What we need folks to do is that if it’s happening in your home, you have a funny smell, just evacuate, come out to the street,” Mayor Dan Rivera of Lawrence told WBZ-TV <https://boston.cbslocal.com/2018/09/13/lawrence-fires-explosions-gas-main/> . The worst part, said Maria Santana, who was at home in Lawrence when she smelled gas, was that the explosions came without warning and that no one in authority seemed to have any idea of what was happening. A school not far from her home that her children and grandchildren had attended was damaged, she said. ADVERTISEMENT “We didn’t know anything then and we still don’t know anything,” she said. “We don’t even know how we’re standing up right now.” Image Natural gas, and the possibility that gas had become overpressurized in a main, was the focus of many local authorities on Thursday evening.CreditCarl Russo/The Eagle-Tribune, via Associated Press Maureen Taylor, 55, had been putting a roast in the oven at her Andover home when something seemed strange: The gas stove made the usual clicking noises, but it would not light. “I wasn’t getting any gas,” she said. “It was very bizarre.” A minute or so later, her phone buzzed with an alarm telling her to evacuate. “I’m very lucky that the stove didn’t go off,” she said. On her way to a senior center for shelter, Ms. Taylor saw two homes in her neighborhood burning. Officers were gathered on the streets. At the senior center, Ms. Taylor said she was surrounded by dozens of other people who wondered what would come next. “They’re worried about getting home,” she said. “They’re worried about their animals. Because really we were just given a few minutes to evacuate, and we keep hearing new information about whether we’re going to go back tonight or not.” As the night wore on, leaders of the three towns suggested that residents who had been evacuated needed to stay away — at least for now. No timeline for cleanup and safety checks was set, they said, and no one had a real sense of how much damage had been done. Mr. Rivera said the affected properties in Lawrence were south of the Merrimack River. He warned people not to return to their homes on Thursday evening, and that it may take days to ensure that homes are safe to enter. ADVERTISEMENT “If you are out of the house, stay away from your properties until we have made it safe for everyone,” Mr. Rivera said. “If you have not evacuated, you have just got to go. Trust us when we tell you that if you stay in your home, you will be at risk.” Gov. Charlie Baker said public safety officers and government officials are focused on trying to make sure that people are safe and that communities make it through the night safely, despite the loss of power and lingering fears over gas. Later, he said, he will turn his attention to what caused the explosion. “We’ll get to the question about what happened,” he said. Katharine Q. Seelye reported from Lawrence, Mass.; Farah Stockman from Cambridge, Mass.; Jacey Fortin from New York; and Monica Davey from Chicago. Andrew R. Chow and Julia Jacobs contributed reporting from New York.

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WV Economic Growth (?) and Natural Gas
by William V. DePaulo, Esq. via EC 17 Aug '18

17 Aug '18

Ted Boettner, Dean Baker: Is WV's economic 'comeback' real? (Gazette Opinion) - By Ted Boettner and Dean Baker - 10 hrs ago - (0) <https://www.wvgazettemail.com/opinion/gazette_opinion/op_ed_commentaries/te…> *Local journalism makes a difference* Your support makes that possible — subscribe today <https://www.wvgazettemail.com/subscriptions> [image: Slide1.jpeg] Over the last few months there has been a flurry of op-eds and articles from big corporations and Republican lawmakers arguing that state budget cuts and low-wage policies like “Right-to-Work” are resulting in a booming economy in our state. Some have gone so far to say West Virginia is “America’s Comeback Kid.” West Virginia’s economy is growing in some sectors — most notably natural gas — but it is performing poorly compared to other states and has yet to recover from the Great Recession that begin more than 10 years ago. Let’s dig into the numbers. First, let’s look at our economic recovery from the Great Recession, which began in December 2007 and officially ended in June of 2009. Altogether, West Virginia has about 9,000 fewer jobs and has seen its labor force shrink by 34,000 from December 2007 to June 2018. Only one other state in the country (Wyoming, another energy state) has had slower job growth over this period. West Virginia also had a larger reduction in its workforce than any other state. The state’s economic growth – or change in real (inflation adjusted) Gross Domestic Product (GDP) – was about 9.1 percent from 2007 to 2017, less than 1 percent annually, compared to the U.S. average of 13 percent. Meanwhile, West Virginia is one of 13 states with an unemployment rate higher today than at the start of the Great Recession. As of June 2018, West Virginia had the third highest unemployment rate in the nation at 5.3 percent. Over the last year, employment has grown by 0.9 percent in the Mountain State, which was below the U.S. average and slower than most states. While West Virginia’s real GDP over the last two years has grown relatively fast compared to other states, this is almost entirely fueled by the rise in natural gas prices, which have grown by about 66 percent or $1 per thousand cubic feet over the last two years. The rise in natural gas prices has unleashed a pipeline building construction boom along with more natural gas production – growing from 1.3 trillion to 1.6 trillion cubic feet of production over the last two years. West Virginia’s real GDP grew by $1.8 billion over the last year. However, $1.4 billion or 78 percent of this growth was from the mining sector that includes natural gas extraction, coal mining, and other mining. The growth in natural gas extraction and metallurgical coal production is not only the central reason for the strong GDP growth over this period but it is mostly likely responsible for West Virginia’s relative strong earnings growth over the last year. This means that West Virginia’s politicians can’t really take credit for the growth of the last two years, unless they want to claim responsibility for the jump in world energy prices that gave us $3.00 a gallon gas. The loss of oil exports from Venezuela and Iran has far more to do with recent growth than the end of “Obama’s war on coal” While state and local public policy can impact economic growth – especially over the long-run (think infrastructure, education, higher education) – its effects are typically small in the short run outside of a burst of deficit spending (which has to be paid back over the medium-run) or a big infusion of federal money. For example, the expansion of Medicaid to working adults has increased federal spending in West Virginia by $900 million per year while the Trump tax cuts — that mostly go to the wealthy — will cut taxes by over $1 billion per year in West Virginia. Other factors that play a big role in state economic growth are climate, proximity to national markets, energy prices, the availability of raw materials and natural resources, and the composition of each state’s economy. The state is also largely at the mercy of national and global economic trends, such as economic recessions caused by housing and tech bubbles, or tight monetary policy through interest-rate hikes. Most people and businesses look for a good quality of life, sound infrastructure, world-class schools, and a place where they can make money. While jobs and our labor market are beginning to rebound, it is important that we have a clear understanding of the evidence and data before asserting that state or federal policies over the last several years are responsible for the recent economic growth. West Virginia’s economy still has a long way to go before it gets back to where it was over a decade ago and most of our economic growth is tied up in volatile industries where the benefits largely go out of state and the work is insecure. Over the last decade, most West Virginia households have seen no income gains from the state’s economic growth. If policymakers want to grow the state’s economy so it benefits everyone, not just a few, they will need to put more money, power, and skills in the hands of working families. This could include targeted tax cuts for low-income families, investing more in higher education and public broadband, raising the minimum wage, paid sick days for all, using severance taxes to build a sustainable future, and creating a paid family leave program. These policies not only keep more money inside our state, but they also provide a foundation for broader growth and prosperity. Ted Boettner is the Executive Director of the West Virginia Center on Budget and Policy and Dean Baker is a Senior Economist at the Center for Economic and Policy Research in Washington, DC. William V. DePaulo, Esq. 860 Court Street, North Suite 300 Lewisburg, WV 24901 Tel 304-342-5588 Fax 866-850-1501 william.depaulo(a)gmail.com

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Re: [EC] [App. Gas Working Grp.] The intensification of the water footprint of hydraulic fracturing
by cindy rank via EC 17 Aug '18

17 Aug '18

from Tony Ingraffea: Anthony R. Ingraffea [image: Attachments]10:52 AM (52 minutes ago) to *sshonkoff(a)psehealthyenergy.org <sshonkoff(a)psehealthyenergy.org>*, *earthworks*, *Terry*, Amy, Cleanup In shale gas and oil, it has always been about SCALE: the stuff is so damn stingy you have to bludgeon it. Generation I wells used 3-5 millions gallons of water and 1-2 hundred pounds of sand per foot of lateral; gen II Wells, 5-10 million gallons, 500-1000 pounds of sand per foot; current gen III Wells, 10-30 million gallons, a ton of sand, and the laterals are now longer than 2 miles long. EIA forecasts a million more such wells in the next 20 years: you do the math. Might as well just transport The Fingerlakes and much of Wisconsin underground. Getting so absurd that one needs a calculator with only scientific notation to run the numbers: 10 trillion gallons of water, 20 trillion pounds of sand. Think about the carbon footprint of acquiring and transporting it.... We have solutions to this nonsense. Best Tony Sent from my iPad ========================== On Thu, Aug 16, 2018 at 9:53 AM David McMahon <wvdavid(a)wvdavid.net> wrote: > Hi, > > I know that with experience the industry is drilling > longer and longer horizontal well bores – up to 2 or 3 miles when at the > beginning the standard was about 1 mile. Does the article say that this > explains the increased water use or is it more water per foot of horizontal? > > > Dave > > > > David McMahon > > e-Mail: wvdavid(a)wvdavid.net > > Land line: 304-415-4288 > > Fax: 810-958-6143 > > Physical address: 1018 Kanawha Blvd E. #1200 > > Charleston, WV 25301 > > Postal address: 1624 Kenwood Road > > Charleston, WV 25314 > > > > *From:* appalachian-gas-working-group(a)googlegroups.com [mailto: > appalachian-gas-working-group(a)googlegroups.com] *On Behalf Of *William V. > DePaulo, Esq. > *Sent:* Wednesday, August 15, 2018 7:58 PM > *To:* Energy Committee; Appalachian-Gas-Working-Group > *Subject:* [App. Gas Working Grp.] The intensification of the water > footprint of hydraulic fracturing > > > http://advances.sciencemag.org/content/4/8/eaar5982 > The intensification of the water footprint of hydraulic fracturing > > *1. **Andrew J. Kondash**, * > > *2. **Nancy E. Lauer* *and * > > *3. **Avner Vengosh*** > <http://advances.sciencemag.org/content/4/8/eaar5982#corresp-1>* > > See all authors and affiliations > > Science Advances 15 Aug 2018: > Vol. 4, no. 8, eaar5982 > DOI: 10.1126/sciadv.aar5982 > > > > · *Article <http://advances.sciencemag.org/content/4/8/eaar5982>* > > · *Figures & Data > <http://advances.sciencemag.org/content/4/8/eaar5982/tab-figures-data>* > > · *Info & Metrics > <http://advances.sciencemag.org/content/4/8/eaar5982/tab-article-info>* > > · *eLetters > <http://advances.sciencemag.org/content/4/8/eaar5982/tab-e-letters>* > > · * PDF > <http://advances.sciencemag.org/content/4/8/eaar5982/tab-pdf>* > Abstract > > Unconventional oil and gas exploration in the United States has > experienced a period of rapid growth, followed by several years of limited > production due to falling and low natural gas and oil prices. Throughout > this transition, the water use for hydraulic fracturing and wastewater > production in major shale gas and oil production regions has increased; > from 2011 to 2016, the water use per well increased up to 770%, while > flowback and produced water volumes generated within the first year of > production increased up to 1440%. The water-use intensity (that is, > normalized to the energy production) increased ubiquitously in all U.S. > shale basins during this transition period. The steady increase of the > water footprint of hydraulic fracturing with time implies that future > unconventional oil and gas operations will require larger volumes of water > for hydraulic fracturing, which will result in larger produced oil and gas > wastewater volumes. > INTRODUCTION > > The environmental impacts of a fossil fuel–powered economy have led many > nations across the world to begin developing greener energy and > transportation solutions. In particular, the water footprint of fossil fuel > exploration and electricity production has been projected to have major > environmental impacts. It has been estimated that global water withdrawal > for energy production constitutes 15% of the world’s total water > consumption (*1* > <http://advances.sciencemag.org/content/4/8/eaar5982#ref-1>). Rapidly > diminishing global water resources due to population growth and climate > change have further exacerbated energy dependence on water availability, > particularly in water-scarce regions (*2* > <http://advances.sciencemag.org/content/4/8/eaar5982#ref-2>–*5* > <http://advances.sciencemag.org/content/4/8/eaar5982#ref-5>). The > beginning of the 21st century marks a special era with respect to global > energy and water resources. The development of new drilling technologies > and production strategies such as horizontal drilling and hydraulic > fracturing has significantly improved the production of natural gas and oil > by stimulating fluid flow from impermeable shale rocks previously not > considered viable energy sources. Since the mid-2000s, these developments > have spurred exponential growth of unconventional gas and oil well drilling > across the United States and are spreading now to other parts of the world (*Figs. > 1* <http://advances.sciencemag.org/content/4/8/eaar5982#F1> and *2* > <http://advances.sciencemag.org/content/4/8/eaar5982#F2>) (*4* > <http://advances.sciencemag.org/content/4/8/eaar5982#ref-4>, *6* > <http://advances.sciencemag.org/content/4/8/eaar5982#ref-6>–*10* > <http://advances.sciencemag.org/content/4/8/eaar5982#ref-10>). The rise > of unconventional energy development has generated public debate on its > environmental implications (*11* > <http://advances.sciencemag.org/content/4/8/eaar5982#ref-11>–*16* > <http://advances.sciencemag.org/content/4/8/eaar5982#ref-16>), especially > with respect to both water availability and quality (*2* > <http://advances.sciencemag.org/content/4/8/eaar5982#ref-2>, *4* > <http://advances.sciencemag.org/content/4/8/eaar5982#ref-4>, *8* > <http://advances.sciencemag.org/content/4/8/eaar5982#ref-8>, *17* > <http://advances.sciencemag.org/content/4/8/eaar5982#ref-17>–*21* > <http://advances.sciencemag.org/content/4/8/eaar5982#ref-21>). > > > <http://advances.sciencemag.org/content/advances/4/8/eaar5982/F1.large.jpg?w…> > > · *Download high-res image* > <http://advances.sciencemag.org/content/advances/4/8/eaar5982/F1.large.jpg?d…> > > · *Open in new tab* > <http://advances.sciencemag.org/content/advances/4/8/eaar5982/F1.large.jpg> > > · *Download Powerpoint* > <http://advances.sciencemag.org/highwire/powerpoint/206438> > > *Fig. 1**Map of water stress and shale plays.* > > (*A*) Map showing the global water stress overlaid with shale formations > across the world. (*B*) Water stress and shale regions in the United > States examined in this study (*5* > <http://advances.sciencemag.org/content/4/8/eaar5982#ref-5>, *10* > <http://advances.sciencemag.org/content/4/8/eaar5982#ref-10>). > > > <http://advances.sciencemag.org/content/advances/4/8/eaar5982/F2.large.jpg?w…> > > · *Download high-res image* > <http://advances.sciencemag.org/content/advances/4/8/eaar5982/F2.large.jpg?d…> > > · *Open in new tab* > <http://advances.sciencemag.org/content/advances/4/8/eaar5982/F2.large.jpg> > > · *Download Powerpoint* > <http://advances.sciencemag.org/highwire/powerpoint/206491> > > *Fig. 2**Box plots of water use with lateral lengths.* > > Water use per well data (cubic meter per well; left *y* axis) for shale > gas (*top row*) and tight oil regions (*bottom row*) with median lateral > lengths per well (meter per well; right *y* axis) for each region plotted > as colored lines. The central line of each box is the median, while the top > and bottom of each box represent the third and first quartile, > respectively. Whiskers on the box plot represent maximum and minimum > values, while circles above the box plots show outliers in the data. > Whiskers on the colored lateral length lines show the 95% bootstrap > confidence intervals. > > The process of hydraulic fracturing uses large volumes of water mixed with > chemicals and proppant (sand) to fracture and hold open fractures in > low-permeability shale and tight oil rocks to allow extraction of > hydrocarbons. Despite higher water intensity (the amount of water used to > produce a unit of energy; for example, liters per gigajoules) of hydraulic > fracturing compared to conventional vertical oil and gas wells, it has been > shown that the overall water withdrawal for hydraulic fracturing is > negligible compared to other industrial water uses on a national level ( > *6* <http://advances.sciencemag.org/content/4/8/eaar5982#ref-6>, *7* > <http://advances.sciencemag.org/content/4/8/eaar5982#ref-7>, *22* > <http://advances.sciencemag.org/content/4/8/eaar5982#ref-22>, *23* > <http://advances.sciencemag.org/content/4/8/eaar5982#ref-23>). On a local > scale, however, water use for hydraulic fracturing can cause conflicts over > water availability, especially in arid regions such as western United > States, where water supplies are limited (*2* > <http://advances.sciencemag.org/content/4/8/eaar5982#ref-2>, *20* > <http://advances.sciencemag.org/content/4/8/eaar5982#ref-20>, *24* > <http://advances.sciencemag.org/content/4/8/eaar5982#ref-24>, *25* > <http://advances.sciencemag.org/content/4/8/eaar5982#ref-25>). > > The wastewater generated from hydraulic fracturing is composed of a blend > of returned injected hydraulic fracturing water and typically high saline > formation water that flows back out of the well after hydraulic fracturing > to generate flowback and produced (FP) waters. Over time, the contribution > of the saline formation water increases, which results in an increase in > the salinity of the FP water. The salts, toxic elements, organic matter, > and naturally occurring radioactive material in the FP water pose > contamination risks to local ecosystems from spills (*14* > <http://advances.sciencemag.org/content/4/8/eaar5982#ref-14>, *26* > <http://advances.sciencemag.org/content/4/8/eaar5982#ref-26>) and > mismanagement (*6* > <http://advances.sciencemag.org/content/4/8/eaar5982#ref-6>, *27* > <http://advances.sciencemag.org/content/4/8/eaar5982#ref-27>–*29* > <http://advances.sciencemag.org/content/4/8/eaar5982#ref-29>). In > addition to these risks, treatment of the FP water to safely return and > release to the environment is energy-intensive and expensive; thus, many > operators are forced to either recycle the FP water onsite for future > hydraulic fracturing operations or reinject it into deep-injection wells. > > Current technological limitations to the efficiency of hydraulic > fracturing include a rapid decrease (20 to 50% of total production after > the first year) in unconventional gas and oil production through time after > initial production, and the fact that a significant portion of the gas in > the shale formations is left unproduced (*22* > <http://advances.sciencemag.org/content/4/8/eaar5982#ref-22>, *30* > <http://advances.sciencemag.org/content/4/8/eaar5982#ref-30>). Despite > these limitations, advancements in hydraulic fracturing and horizontal > drilling technology have increased production of gas and oil from shale > regions; between 2007 and 2016, the shale gas production has increased by > eightfold in the United States (*1* > <http://advances.sciencemag.org/content/4/8/eaar5982#ref-1>). Two recent > studies have suggested that intensification of the hydraulic fracturing > process through drilling longer horizontal laterals has resulted in > increased water use and hydrocarbon production (*20* > <http://advances.sciencemag.org/content/4/8/eaar5982#ref-20>, *25* > <http://advances.sciencemag.org/content/4/8/eaar5982#ref-25>). Given the > relatively long history of hydraulic fracturing in United States, > understanding how the water footprint of hydraulic fracturing has evolved > through time with technological advancements and shifting economic > conditions is critical (*22* > <http://advances.sciencemag.org/content/4/8/eaar5982#ref-22>, *23* > <http://advances.sciencemag.org/content/4/8/eaar5982#ref-23>). Lessons > learned from U.S. production development can directly influence planning > and implementation of hydraulic fracturing practices, as other countries > such as China bring their natural gas reserves online. > > For the first time, this study presents systematic temporal data on water > use, unconventional shale gas and tight oil production rates, and volume of > FP water from major shale-producing regions in the United States. In > addition, we combine several databases to estimate the efficiency of > production from both hydrocarbons and water perspective on a year-by-year > basis, showing that the water footprint of hydraulic fracturing has been > steadily increasing through time. > RESULTS > > In each of the six regions studied in this report, water use per well is > increasing (*Fig. 2* > <http://advances.sciencemag.org/content/4/8/eaar5982#F2> and tables S1 > and S2). The Marcellus region (Pennsylvania and West Virginia) had the > lowest increase in water use (20%), from a median value of 23,400 m3 per > well in 2011 to 27,950 m3 per well in 2016, while the Permian Basin > (Texas and New Mexico) had the largest increase in water use (770%), from > 4900 m3 per well in 2011 up to 42,500 m3 per well in 2016. Median > water-use volumes varied largely among regions, with the Bakken region > using the least water (21,100 m3 per well in 2016) and the Permian basin > using the most water (42,500 m3 per well in 2016). One exception is the > Haynesville region, where water use per well decreased with time (*Fig. 2* > <http://advances.sciencemag.org/content/4/8/eaar5982#F2>). Horizontal > drilling requires producers to drill vertically to a target depth and then > curve the well horizontally through shale formations, maximizing the > surface area producing oil and gas. The length of the portion of the well > that was drilled horizontally is referred to as the lateral length, with > hydraulic fracturing events occurring in stages as a well is drilled > further horizontally. Over the period of 2011–2016, the median length of > lateral section of horizontal wells also increased (tables S1 and S2), most > likely due to technological development and economic considerations to > increase the extraction yields from individual wells. We show below that > the hydrocarbon extraction intensity has similarly increased during this > period. Parallel to the increase in lateral lengths of the horizontal wells > and hydrocarbon extraction yields through time, the water use has also > increased. The relative increase in lateral length (0 to 80%) was, however, > significantly lower than the increase in water use (14 to 770%). There are > two exceptions to this observation: (i) in the Marcellus region, the > increase in lateral length (20%) was equal to the increasing water use > (25%); (ii) oil-producing wells in the Permian basin, where lateral length > increase (79%) and water-use increase (770%) were both higher than those in > the other studied regions. When water use per well is normalized to the > length of lateral section of the horizontal well, in almost every case, we > observed an increase in water use per length of the horizontal well. This > pattern is most evident in the Permian region, where water use increased > from 4.3 m3 per meter in 2011 to 29.0 m3 per meter in 2016 for > gas-producing wells, and from 3.9 m3 per meter in 2011 to 19.0 m3 per > meter in oil-producing wells (tables S1 and S2). The smallest observed > changes were in the Marcellus and Haynesville regions, where water use per > horizontal length has been relatively consistent through time. > > In all cases, the FP water generation was also increasing through time, > with particularly higher rates after 2014 (*Fig. 3* > <http://advances.sciencemag.org/content/4/8/eaar5982#F3> and tables S1 > and S2). Both the gas- and oil-producing portions of the Eagle Ford region > showed large increases through time, with a 610% increase in FP water in > the oil-bearing section (from 2400 m3 per well in 2011 to 16,900 m3per > well in 2015) and a 1440% increase in the gas-bearing section (from 1340 m > 3 per well in 2011 to 20,700 m3 per well in 2015). The smallest increase > in FP water occurred in the Niobrara region, where production increased > from 1800 m3 per well in 2011 to 2300 m3 per well in 2016. > > > <http://advances.sciencemag.org/content/advances/4/8/eaar5982/F3.large.jpg?w…> > > · *Download high-res image* > <http://advances.sciencemag.org/content/advances/4/8/eaar5982/F3.large.jpg?d…> > > · *Open in new tab* > <http://advances.sciencemag.org/content/advances/4/8/eaar5982/F3.large.jpg> > > · *Download Powerpoint* > <http://advances.sciencemag.org/highwire/powerpoint/206457> > > *Fig. 3**Oil, gas, and FP water variations with time.* > > Annual shale gas (*A*), tight oil (*C*), and FP water (*B* and *D*) > productions in shale gas–producing regions (A and B) and oil-producing > regions (C and D). Whiskers on the bar graphs represent 95% bootstrap > confidence intervals (table S1). > > Coupled with the increase in water use and FP water production rates, > unconventional natural gas production shows an upward trend in production, > with volumes increasing through time among the regions. Year 1 shale gas > production in the Permian region increased from 10.9 × 106 m3 per well in > 2011 to 25.1 × 106 m3 per well in 2016, a 360% increase (*Fig. 3* > <http://advances.sciencemag.org/content/4/8/eaar5982#F3>). Similarly, > year 1 shale gas production in the Marcellus formation increased through > time, from 21.8 × 106 m3 per well in 2011 to 29.0 × 106 m3 per well in > 2015, before falling to 20.8 × 106 m3 per well in 2016. In contrast, in > the Eagle Ford formation, year 1 production remained relatively constant > from 2011 to 2014, before increasing from 2014 to 2015. > > Unconventional oil production shows a consistent increase in year 1 oil > production volume per well through time, with values falling only in the > Eagle Ford region from 2014 to 2015. The largest increase was in the > Permian region, where oil production increased from 8200 m3 per well in > 2011 to 16,700 m3 per well in 2016, a 130% increase (*Fig. 3* > <http://advances.sciencemag.org/content/4/8/eaar5982#F3>). When comparing > our estimate of total year 1 hydrocarbon production (year 1 estimate > multiplied by well count estimate) to total hydrocarbon production reported > by the Energy Information Administration (EIA) (fig. S1) (*31* > <http://advances.sciencemag.org/content/4/8/eaar5982#ref-31>), we see > that year 1 production parallels total oil production in most regions in > the United States. > > We define the water-use intensity for hydraulic fracturing as the amount > of water used for hydraulic fracturing to generate a unit of energy from > the produced gas and oil (see Materials and Methods) (*19* > <http://advances.sciencemag.org/content/4/8/eaar5982#ref-19>, *23* > <http://advances.sciencemag.org/content/4/8/eaar5982#ref-23>, *32* > <http://advances.sciencemag.org/content/4/8/eaar5982#ref-32>). In > gas-producing regions, water-use intensity (for the first 12 months of > production) ranges from 7 liters/GJ (Haynesville) to 21 liters/GJ > (Marcellus) in 2011 and grew to between 13.5 liters/GJ (Haynesville) and 33 > liters/GJ (Permian) in 2016 (*Fig. 4* > <http://advances.sciencemag.org/content/4/8/eaar5982#F4> and tables S1 > and S2). Unconventional oil regions also have increasing water-use > intensities, increasing from 11 liters/GJ (Permian) in 2011 to between 28 > liters/GJ (Bakken and Permian) in 2016 and 50 liters/GJ (Eagle Ford) in > 2015. For comparison, the average water intensity of conventional natural > gas is only 4 liters/GJ for drilling and extraction, while coal mining > constitutes a mean value of 43 liters/GJ (fig. S4) (*33* > <http://advances.sciencemag.org/content/4/8/eaar5982#ref-33>). Water-use > intensity is also calculated as the ratio between the volume of water used > and the volume of hydrocarbon produced (tables S1 and S2 and fig. S2). The > increase of the water use to hydrocarbon production ratios with time > indicates that the intensification of hydraulic fracturing process to > increase hydrocarbon production rates involves net addition of water, and > thus, the water intensity has increased with time. > > > <http://advances.sciencemag.org/content/advances/4/8/eaar5982/F4.large.jpg?w…> > > · *Download high-res image* > <http://advances.sciencemag.org/content/advances/4/8/eaar5982/F4.large.jpg?d…> > > · *Open in new tab* > <http://advances.sciencemag.org/content/advances/4/8/eaar5982/F4.large.jpg> > > · *Download Powerpoint* > <http://advances.sciencemag.org/highwire/powerpoint/206464> > > *Fig. 4**The changes in the water intensity of hydraulic fracturing with > time.* > > Water-use intensity variations with time for hydraulic fracturing of shale > gas (*A*) and tight oil (*C*) regions and corresponding FP water/water > use ratios in shale gas (*B*) and tight oil (*D*) regions. Water-use > intensity is defined as the amount of water required to generate a unit of > energy. (A) and (B) show the water-use intensity for shale gas–producing > regions, while (C) and (D) show water-use intensity for unconventional > oil-producing regions. Whiskers represent 95% bootstrap confidence > intervals. > > When comparing the volume of FP water production rates to the water used > for hydraulic fracturing, we show that, in many cases, more water is used > for hydraulic fracturing than returns as FP water over the first year (*Fig. > 4* <http://advances.sciencemag.org/content/4/8/eaar5982#F4>; FP > water/water use ratio < 1). In shale gas–producing regions, we see an > increase in the ratio through time, with the exception of the Permian > region, which increases from 2011 to 2014 but then drops in 2015 and 2016. > The Permian region is also unique as the FP water/water use ratios for both > unconventional oil and gas wells are higher than 1. Unconventional > oil-producing regions have varying trends in the FP water/water use ratio. > Wells in the Eagle Ford oil region have an increasing ratio through time, > while no consistent trend is observed in the Bakken, Permian, and Niobrara > regions (*Fig. 4* <http://advances.sciencemag.org/content/4/8/eaar5982#F4> > and table S2). Regions where the FP water/water use ratios were > increasing through time present a growing water management challenge, as > the net increase (14 to 770%) in the water use (*Fig. 4* > <http://advances.sciencemag.org/content/4/8/eaar5982#F4> and tables S1 > and S2) is coupled with increasing FP water production, growing at even > higher rates (60 to 1440%). This trend exacerbates water management issues > because producers must now manage increasingly large volumes of water for > hydraulic fracturing operations as well as larger oil and gas wastewater > volumes that need to be adequately disposed. > DISCUSSION > > Much of the controversy surrounding hydraulic fracturing revolves around > the use of large volumes of water to hydraulically fracture wells. Concern > is especially high in semiarid regions (*Fig. 1* > <http://advances.sciencemag.org/content/4/8/eaar5982#F1>), where water > withdrawals for hydraulic fracturing can account for a significant portion > of consumptive water use within a given region, even contributing to > groundwater resource depletion (*2* > <http://advances.sciencemag.org/content/4/8/eaar5982#ref-2>). Overall, > there have been calls to increase the use of alternative water sources such > as brackish water or recycling FP water, minimizing the strain on local > freshwater resources (*2* > <http://advances.sciencemag.org/content/4/8/eaar5982#ref-2>, *25* > <http://advances.sciencemag.org/content/4/8/eaar5982#ref-25>). > > Previous studies have suggested that hydraulic fracturing does not use > significantly more water for exploration and production than other energy > sources (fig. S4) and, at the same time, indicated that water use for > hydraulic fracturing makes up only a small fraction of the industrial water > utilization in the United States (*7* > <http://advances.sciencemag.org/content/4/8/eaar5982#ref-7>, *22* > <http://advances.sciencemag.org/content/4/8/eaar5982#ref-22>, *23* > <http://advances.sciencemag.org/content/4/8/eaar5982#ref-23>, *33* > <http://advances.sciencemag.org/content/4/8/eaar5982#ref-33>). These > evaluations were based on aggregated water footprint data during the early > years (2011–2014) of hydraulic fracturing in the United States. Here, we > show, however, steadily increasing volumes of water use with time in all > the major unconventional gas and oil regions (*Fig. 2* > <http://advances.sciencemag.org/content/4/8/eaar5982#F2> and tables S1 > and S2). Parallel to the increase of shale gas and tight oil production > intensity, we also show that the water intensity of hydraulic fracturing is > increasing for both unconventional gas and oil regions (*Fig. 4* > <http://advances.sciencemag.org/content/4/8/eaar5982#F4> and tables S3 > and S4). In addition, the water used for hydraulic fracturing is retained > within the shale formation; only a small fraction of the fresh water > injected into the ground returns as flowback water, while the greater > volume of FP water returning to the surface is highly saline, is difficult > to treat, and is often disposed through deep-injection wells. This means > that despite lower water intensity compared to other energy resources (fig. > S4), the permanent loss of water use for hydraulic fracturing from the > hydrosphere could outweigh its relatively lower water intensity. > > The period of 2014–2015 marks a turning point, where water use and FP > water production began to increase at higher rates. During this period, gas > and oil prices dropped significantly, causing producers to scale back the > number of new installed wells (*Fig. 5* > <http://advances.sciencemag.org/content/4/8/eaar5982#F5> and tables S1 > and S2). In each of the oil-producing regions, the water use/oil production > ratio increased, suggesting that the increase in water use for hydraulic > fracturing outpaces the increasing oil production on a per-well basis (*Fig. > 4* <http://advances.sciencemag.org/content/4/8/eaar5982#F4>, fig. S2, and > table S2). In the shale gas–producing regions, this trend is also present, > but not as strongly apparent as with the unconventional oil-producing > regions (*Fig. 4* <http://advances.sciencemag.org/content/4/8/eaar5982#F4>, > fig. S2, and table S1). Consequently, while increasing lateral length of > horizontal drilling and water use for hydraulic fracturing (*Fig. 2* > <http://advances.sciencemag.org/content/4/8/eaar5982#F2>) have resulted > in increasing oil production (per well), the net water-use efficiency, > particularly for unconventional oil production, has decreased (that is, > higher water intensity). > > > <http://advances.sciencemag.org/content/advances/4/8/eaar5982/F5.large.jpg?w…> > > · *Download high-res image* > <http://advances.sciencemag.org/content/advances/4/8/eaar5982/F5.large.jpg?d…> > > · *Open in new tab* > <http://advances.sciencemag.org/content/advances/4/8/eaar5982/F5.large.jpg> > > · *Download Powerpoint* > <http://advances.sciencemag.org/highwire/powerpoint/206471> > > *Fig. 5**New shale gas and tight oil well installations compared to oil > and gas prices.* > > Variations of installed well counts (left *y* axis) and gas and oil > prices (right *y* axis) with time for shale gas–producing regions plotted > with corresponding natural gas citygate price (*top*) and for > oil-producing regions with corresponding crude oil price (*bottom*). The > data show the number of new well installations corresponding closely with > the contemporary gas and oil prices. MCF, thousand cubic feet; BBL, barrel. > > By combining the increasing trends in both water use and FP water > production with the increasing FP water/water use ratios in some regions, > we can see that the overall water footprint of hydraulic fracturing is > increasing through time; more water is being used for hydraulic fracturing > operations, while, at the same time, comparatively more FP water is being > generated. We observed increasing total water use (water use per well > multiplied by well count; fig. S3) in oil-producing regions despite the > recent slowdown in oil production rates (*Fig. 5* > <http://advances.sciencemag.org/content/4/8/eaar5982#F5>). Assuming that > the recent economic downturn eventually subsides and the drilling of new > wells again reaches levels seen during the heyday of hydraulic fracturing > in the early 2010s, the total water impact of hydraulic fracturing is > poised to increase markedly in both shale gas– and oil-producing regions. > On the basis of modeling future hydraulic fracturing operations in the > United States in two scenarios of drilling rates, we project cumulative > water use and FP water volumes to increase by up to 50-fold in > unconventional gas-producing regions and up to 20-fold in unconventional > oil-producing regions from 2018 to 2030, assuming that the growth of water > use matches current growth rates and the drilling of new wells again > matches peak production (fig. S5 and tables S3 and S4). Even if future > drilling rates will stay at 2016 levels (that is, low oil gas prices), we > predict a large increase of the total water use for both unconventional oil > and shale gas basins (fig. S5). Likewise, we predict a large increase in > the FP water volume for the two scenarios, with particularly high total FP > water production in the Permian and Eagle Ford basins (fig. S5). > > The increase in the water footprint of hydraulic fracturing shown in this > study has serious implication for local communities, where increased > drilling volume will lead to large instantaneous water demands, and > resulting in increasing FP water burdens that will have to be managed into > the future. The predicted increasing water use and FP water production in > the Permian and Eagle Ford basins are alarming given the extreme water > scarcity in these regions (*Fig. 1* > <http://advances.sciencemag.org/content/4/8/eaar5982#F1>). The results > presented in this study are consistent with previous studies in the Permian > (*19* <http://advances.sciencemag.org/content/4/8/eaar5982#ref-19>) and > Eagle Ford (*25* > <http://advances.sciencemag.org/content/4/8/eaar5982#ref-25>) basins that > have shown that local water resources could be affected by increasing water > demands for hydraulic fracturing. At the same time, other studies have > shown that water use for hydraulic fracturing in water-rich areas such as > the Sichuan basin in China (*8* > <http://advances.sciencemag.org/content/4/8/eaar5982#ref-8>, *34* > <http://advances.sciencemag.org/content/4/8/eaar5982#ref-34>) will > constitute only a small fraction of the available local water resources. > While the water intensity during early stages of hydraulic fracturing (<30 > liters/GJ in most cases) was comparable and even lower than that of coal > mining (43 liters/GJ; fig. S4), the recent (2014–2017) intensification of > hydraulic fracturing has increased the water intensity, particularly for > unconventional oil (up to 93 liters/GJ; fig. S4). Additional studies are > needed to analyze the local impacts of hydraulic fracturing on water > resource depletion in light of increasing water demand for hydraulic > fracturing and the increasing volumes of FP water that need to be managed, > particularly in areas vulnerable to induced seismicity from injection of > large volumes of oil and gas wastewater. As unconventional gas and oil > exploration is expanding globally and other countries begin to follow the > U.S. shale revolution (for example, China) (*34* > <http://advances.sciencemag.org/content/4/8/eaar5982#ref-34>), the > results of this study should be used as a guidance for the expected water > footprint of hydraulic fracturing at different stages of energy development. > MATERIALS AND METHODS > Experimental design > > The goal of this study was to synthesize and collate production volumes > for unconventional gas and oil production, associated FP water, and water > use for hydraulic fracturing per shale gas/oil well. We downloaded > production data for each of these components from the major shale gas and > tight oil regions identified in this study using multiple sources and > separated by year of initial production. Once organized, data were reported > based on the first 12 months of the well lifetime to see how production and > water-use values compared on a year-by-year basis. > Data acquisition > > Production volumes for gas, oil, and FP water for each reporting well in > our target regions were downloaded using the DrillingInfo Desktop > application (*35* > <http://advances.sciencemag.org/content/4/8/eaar5982#ref-35>). Data were > downloaded by primary well production type (gas or oil). FP water data (and > natural gas production for 2015–2016) were not available from the Marcellus > region, and thus, data from the Marcellus Formation were downloaded from > the gas and oil reporting website of the Pennsylvania Department of > Environmental Protection (PA DEP) (*36* > <http://advances.sciencemag.org/content/4/8/eaar5982#ref-36>). Water-use > data were downloaded from the FracFocus Chemical Disclosure Registry (*37* > <http://advances.sciencemag.org/content/4/8/eaar5982#ref-37>). Well > counts from 2014 to 2016 were taken from the EIA Drilling Productivity > Report (DPR) (*31* > <http://advances.sciencemag.org/content/4/8/eaar5982#ref-31>), while well > counts from 2012 to 2014 were taken from Baker Hughes’ onshore well counts ( > *38* <http://advances.sciencemag.org/content/4/8/eaar5982#ref-38>). The > well counts provided did not indicate if they were taken from conventional > or unconventional oil-producing wells or in regions producing both gas and > oil, and whether the well was classified as an oil well or gas well. > Consequently, we used DrillingInfo to find the ratio of conventional to > unconventional wells and the ratio of oil to gas wells for each region for > each year and multiplied that by the number of wells reported by Baker > Hughes and in the DPR. In addition, wells drilled in the Bakken formation > were not reported by the Baker Hughes report. As a result, Bakken Formation > well counts from 2011 to 2013 were taken from the North Dakota Oil and Gas > Division (*39* > <http://advances.sciencemag.org/content/4/8/eaar5982#ref-39>). Combining > data from several resources can introduce bias and error into results using > these values. Values reported in this study were found to be comparable to > those reported in previous studies. Natural gas and oil historical prices > were taken from the EIA (*1* > <http://advances.sciencemag.org/content/4/8/eaar5982#ref-1>). > Statistical methods > > Data from over 12,000 individual wells were organized by producing region, > American Petroleum Institute (API) number, first production year, and month > since first production. Data were sorted by first production year and then > aligned within each year by month since first production. The median values > among all API numbers reporting data within a given year were calculated > for each month since production began (*22* > <http://advances.sciencemag.org/content/4/8/eaar5982#ref-22>, *23* > <http://advances.sciencemag.org/content/4/8/eaar5982#ref-23>). A similar > analysis was done with the PA DEP Marcellus data. Finally, areas where less > than 0.5% of data are reported (number of DrillingInfo reports/well count < > 0.5%) were removed from the data set. This removed DrillingInfo data for > the Haynesville formation from 2015 and 2016, the Eagle Ford gas- and > oil-producing regions from 2016, and the Marcellus formation from 2015 to > 2016. Marcellus data from 2015 to 2016 were replaced with data from PA DEP. > The region for each water-use data point was determined spatially using the > latitude and longitude provided by FracFocus to locate points within > unconventional gas and oil plays (shapefile provided by the U.S. EIA) ( > *31* <http://advances.sciencemag.org/content/4/8/eaar5982#ref-31>). > Water-use data were then sorted by region, and the median water-use value > was calculated for each spud year. > > Energy intensities were calculated by converting production volumes of gas > and oil to energy production using their energy content. Energy content for > natural gas was assumed to be 0.038 and 38.18 GJ/m3 >

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New fracking wells are using hundreds of times more water than their predecessors
by William V. DePaulo, Esq. via EC 15 Aug '18

15 Aug '18

https://www.popsci.com/fracking-fresh-water New fracking wells are using hundreds of times more water than their predecessors The change between 2011 and 2018 is stark. By Kat Eschner <https://www.popsci.com/authors/kat-eschner> 1 hour ago [image: water flowing over rocks] Fresh water is important to life, and industries. EcoPic <https://depositphotos.com/4563348/stock-photo-flowing-water.html> Over the last few years, fracking operations have gotten more efficient at removing oil and natural gas from the ground—this according to a new study <http://advances.sciencemag.org/content/4/8/eaar5982> published today in the journal Science Advances. That’s good news for the fossil fuels industry, which is getting more than ever out of a given well—but might be bad news for fresh water. The story isn’t the same everywhere. Ever since oil and gas prices decreased in 2014, the number of fracking wells being drilled annually across the country has gone down. But the size and output of the new wells that are being drilled has increased dramatically, because of a method known as horizontal drilling that maximizes the amount of surface area underground for the oil to flow through. Another thing has skyrocketed: the amount of water used in each well. In some places, says study author Avner Vengosh, “this net increase per well caused overall increase” in water usage for fracking in regions where it is practiced. The increase was as much as a whopping 770 percent in the Permian region of West Texas. There, for gas-producing wells, water use went from from about 350 gallons per foot of well in 2011 to 2335 gallons per foot of well in 2016. But in others, such as the Marcellus region of Pennsylvania and West Virginia, the amount of water used overall for fracking stayed about the same even though wells got bigger, because there were fewer of them. The early numbers come from a paper Vengosh and others at Duke published <https://pubs.acs.org/doi/abs/10.1021/acs.estlett.5b00211> in 2015. That study established a baseline, says Vengosh–but when graduate student Andrew Kondash, the new paper’s first author, started looking at the water figures for 2015-2016, the numbers were much, much higher. This led the team to doubt their original data, Vengosh says. But some more work revealed that it was true—water use per well had gone up substantially, even as the number of wells dropped. To figure this out, Kondash looked at water usage data for six major shale deposits across the country. They evaluated how many wells had been drilled, how much water was used in each, and how much wastewater was produced. The totals here represent fracking’s “water footprint”–the fresh water that needs to go in for fracking to take place, and the water mixed with chemicals, sand and—sometimes <https://pubs.acs.org/doi/abs/10.1021/es402165b?journalCode=esthag>—radioactive isotopes that seeps out with the natural gas or oil. “It has been shown that the overall water withdrawal for hydraulic fracturing is negligible compared to other industrial water uses on a national level,” the study reads. Total industrial use is estimated <https://pubs.usgs.gov/circ/1441/circ1441.pdf> at almost 15 million gallons of water per day, for uses ranging from auto manufacturing to mining. “On a local scale, however, water use for [fracking] can cause conflicts over water availability, especially in arid regions such as western United States, where water supplies are limited.” Freshwater availability might be the limiting factor of fuel extraction in the Permian Basin of West Texas, says Vengosh. The oilfields there are predicted <https://www.houstonchronicle.com/business/energy/article/Permian-will-outpa…> to produce historic amounts of crude oil in the next few years—but without the freshwater to do it via fracking, says Vengosh, that wouldn’t be possible. “The water use is part of the system that cannot be mitigated in any way,” he says. The demand for fresh water could promote innovation in fracking technologies. “In many places, the amount of water that’s recycled has gone up” in recent years, says McGill University’s civil engineer Mary Kang, who studies groundwater and fracking. Kang was not involved in the current project. It’s possible that innovation might make water recycling more efficient, says Vangosh. The increased water use means there’s the other factor, he says. “Now they need to deal with a much larger volume of wastewater.” A current common way to deal with it is to pump it into deep wastewater wells, rather than recycling it. That deals with the immediate problem for each individual well, but little is known about the long-term effects. Wastewater injection wells have been linked to increasing numbers of earthquakes <https://www.popsci.com/wastewater-injection-oklahoma-earthquake> in Oklahoma. “Water is not just some uniform resource,” says Kang. Water accessibility and quality are highly variable between locations—and there are parts of the water supply we still don’t really understand yet, like the deep groundwater that she studies. This new study gives everyone from industry to environmentalists a new baseline for figuring out how much water will be used in fracking, and is likely to prompt at least some to reevaluate their water budgets. But the grand total left in those water budgets, and the speed at which they’ll be consumed still remains to be seen. 860 Court Street, North Suite 300 Lewisburg, WV 24901 Tel 304-342-5588 Fax 866-850-1501 william.depaulo(a)gmail.com

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MANCHIN, CAPITO AND McKINNEY ASK FERC TO REISSUE PERMITS FOR ACP AND MVP
by William V. DePaulo, Esq. via EC 14 Aug '18

14 Aug '18

https://www.wvgazettemail.com/news/politics/manchin-capito-mckinley-weigh-i… Manchin, Capito, McKinley weigh in on stopped pipelines - By Kate Mishkin Staff writer <https://www.wvgazettemail.com/users/profile/Kate%20Mishkin> - 2 hrs ago - (0) <https://www.wvgazettemail.com/news/politics/manchin-capito-mckinley-weigh-i…> Three members of West Virginia's congressional delegation have weighed in on two controversial natural gas pipelines, urging federal regulators to keep building them. In a letter dated Monday <https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/4757076-Manchin-Capito-McKinley-Pip…>, Sens. Joe Manchin, D-W.Va., Shelley Moore Capito, R-W.Va., and Rep. David McKinley, R-W.Va. urged the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission to allow construction to resume on the Atlantic Coast Pipeline and Mountain Valley Pipeline as quickly as possible. Construction on both natural gas pipelines was recently halted after the 4th Circuit Court of Appeals ruled that various federal agencies had skirted environmental protections when they approved the projects. FERC issued a stop work order on the Mountain Valley Pipeline late on Aug. 3, and then ordered a halt to the Atlantic Coast Pipeline exactly one week later, on Aug. 10. Environmental and citizen groups called the decision to stop work on both pipelines, at least until federal agencies can issue new permits and resolve the environmental problems, a victory. But in their letter, the lawmakers focused on the jobs and tax revenue that's now on hold. "We write to bring our concerns to your attention, as well as to encourage FERC and the relevant permitting agencies to quickly reconsider, correct and reissue the necessary permits for these projects," they wrote. None of the lawmakers responded to an interview request Tuesday, though. Reps. Alex Mooney and Evan Jenkins didn't sign the letter but their constituents have written to FERC about the pipelines. Mooney wasn't available for a comment, but a spokeswoman for Jenkins responded in an email. "I understand that many people have concerns about these pipelines, but I am confident that FERC and the pipeline developers will find an environmentally-friendly way to move these projects forward in a manner that is fair to landowners.” Jenkins said through a spokeswoman. Gov. Jim Justice, who, in June, said he'd "determine what role the state may play in expediting the construction" of the Mountain Valley Pipeline, also did not respond to a request for comment. Both pipelines will cross all three congressional districts -- the 300-mile-long Mountain Valley Pipeline from Wetzel County, West Virginia to Pittsylvania County, Virginia, and the 600-mile-long Atlantic Coast Pipeline from Harrison County, West Virginia to eastern North Carolina. In the letter, the lawmakers pointed to natural gas as a solution to the state's economic challenges. "We strongly encourage you to work with the permitting agencies in question to resolve the outstanding issues as quickly as possible in a manner that allows for re-issuance of these permits and recommencement of construction," the letter says. "We also ask that you consider amending or lifting the stop work orders on these projects to ensure that the shortest possible portions of the proposed routes are affected by these delays." FERC tapped the brakes on the Mountain Valley Pipeline <https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/4757123-FERC-MVP-Stop-Work-Order.ht…> after an appeals court vacated the Bureau of Land Management’s decision to grant a right of way and the U.S. Forest Service’s decision to allow a right of way and construction through the Jefferson National Forest. In the unanimous decision, Judge Stephanie Thacker wrote that American citizens put their faith in the Forest Service "to protect and preserve this country's forests, and they deserve more than silent acquiescence to a pipeline company's justification for upending large swaths of national forestlands." Then, the appeals court issued an order pulling a right-of-way permit for the National Park Service that authorized construction of the Atlantic Coast Pipeline <https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/4742097-FERC-ACP-stop-work-order.ht…> across the Blue Ridge Parkway and issued a longer explanation for its May 15 decision to pull the U.S. Fish and Wildlife's Incidental Take Statement for the pipeline. On Friday, FERC issued an order stopping that pipeline, too. Per FERC's order, Mountain Valley Pipeline has submitted a 16-page temporary stabilization plan that suggests, among other things, that pipe should be lowered into the ground to avoid UV exposure. The Atlantic Coast Pipeline hasn't yet submitted its stabilization plan. Reach Kate Mishkin at kate.mishkin(a)wvgazettemail.com, 304-348-4843 or follow @katemishkin on Twitter.

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Pipeline Security has become unreasonable or worse
by Duane Nichols via EC 04 Aug '18

04 Aug '18

Here’s local press on the Gerhart hearing. That is one traumatized family: http://www.altoonamirror.com/news/local-news/2018/08/pipeline-foe-gets-mont…

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Federal agency orders work to stop on Mountain Valley Pipeline
by Duane Nichols via EC 03 Aug '18

03 Aug '18

https://www.roanoke.com/news/local/ferc-orders-work-to-stop-on-mountain-val… In a letter to pipeline officials, the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission cited an appeals court decision last week that reversed earlier-granted approvals for pipeline work in the Jefferson National Forest. With work on that 3.6-mile segment of the pipeline now on hold, FERC determined that construction of the rest of the 303-mile project should not proceed.

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FERC STOP WORK ORDER TO MVP ATT'D
by William V. DePaulo, Esq. via EC 03 Aug '18

03 Aug '18

FERC STOP WORK ORDER TO MVP ATT'D QUOTE: *MVP is hereby notified that construction activity along all portions of the Project and in all work areas must cease immediately, with the exception of any measures deemed necessary by those land managing agencies or FERC staff to ensure the stabilization of the right of way and work areas. * William V. DePaulo, Esq. 860 Court Street, North Suite 300 Lewisburg, WV 24901 Tel 304-342-5588 Fax 866-850-1501 william.depaulo(a)gmail.com

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FERC says NO to FirstEnergy Pleasants sale
by frank young via EC 13 Jan '18

13 Jan '18

From: West Virginians For Energy Freedom [mailto:info@energyfreedomwv.org] Sent: Saturday, January 13, 2018 9:51 AM To: fyoung(a)mountain.net Subject: MAJOR NEWS: FERC says NO to FirstEnergy Pleasants sale THANK YOU FOR STANDING UP FOR WEST VIRGINIANS AND FOR ENERGY FREEDOM! Email not displaying correctly? <http://go.communitypowernetwork.org/webmail/126391/203402632/cb86e7159e3395…> View it in your browser. West Virginians For Energy Freedom logo <http://go.communitypowernetwork.org/l/126391/2017-03-06/3tttbv/126391/32679…> FERC denies Pleasants Power Station transfer GREAT NEWS! The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission yesterday denied FirstEnergy Corp.'s request to transfer the Pleasants power plant to Mon Power and Potomac Edison, two of the Ohio company's West Virginia subsidiaries. The decision ends this attempt by FirstEnergy for another bailout from its West Virginia customers. "FERC rejected the Pleasants sale because of the risk that it would result in improper cross-subsidization among subsidiaries of FirstEnergy. This order is not surprising because FirstEnergy clearly orchestrated the sale of the Pleasants plant in order to shift costs and risk from a deregulated subsidiary onto the customers of Mon Power and Potomac Edison." — Cathy Kunkel, an energy analyst with the Institute for Energy Economics and Financial Analysis <http://go.communitypowernetwork.org/e/126391/2018-01-13/4sqfvh/203402632> We'll be sharing more analysis of the decision soon. Watch your inboxes, along with our Facebook <http://go.communitypowernetwork.org/e/126391/estVirginiansForEnergyFreedom-…> and Twitter <http://go.communitypowernetwork.org/e/126391/EnergyFreedomWV/4sqfvm/2034026…> feeds. <http://go.communitypowernetwork.org/e/126391/on-OpenNat-asp-fileID-14797085…> Download and read the FERC decision Read the article in today's Charleston Gazette-Mail <http://go.communitypowernetwork.org/e/126391/84-55e9-b6fd-755af0d0a951-html…> You wrote letters and op-eds, sent faxes and signed petitions, testified at hearings, passed municipal resolutions, and made this a major public issue. THANK YOU FOR ALL OF YOUR SUPPORT AND HARD WORK <http://go.communitypowernetwork.org/e/126391/2018-01-13/4sqfvt/203402632> EnergyFreedomWV.org | 304-460-9833 (WVEF) | <mailto:info@energyfreedomwv.org> Info(a)EnergyFreedomWV.org <http://go.communitypowernetwork.org/unsubscribe/u/126391/cb86e7159e33950f25…> unsubscribe from all emails <http://go.communitypowernetwork.org/email-preference-center?ehash=cb86e7159…> update subscription preferences <http://go.communitypowernetwork.org/r/126391/1/203402632/open/1>

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BUCKLE THINE SEAT BELT: "$83.7 billion energy investment boosts state, WVU on world stage"
by William V. DePaulo, Esq. via EC 09 Nov '17

09 Nov '17

THE TWO GREAT RISKS: 1. IT'S NOT TRUE 2. IT *IS* TRUE. WVU-CHINA DEAL RE GAS HUB <https://wvutoday.wvu.edu/stories/2017/11/09/-83-7-billion-energy-investment…> William V. DePaulo, Esq. 122 N Court Street, Suite 300 Lewisburg, WV 24901 Tel 304-342-5588 Fax 866-850-1501 william.depaulo(a)gmail.com

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Fw: 2017 National Energy Conference - October 20
by James Kotcon via EC 20 Sep '17

20 Sep '17

FYI. JBK ________________________________ From: WVU Law Center for Energy & Sustainable Development <wvulaw(a)mail.wvu.edu> Sent: Wednesday, September 20, 2017 3:00 PM To: James Kotcon Subject: 2017 National Energy Conference - October 20 [http://d31hzlhk6di2h5.cloudfront.net/20170920/af/0e/f8/a9/957d4c74790fe1936…] <https://t.e2ma.net/click/3cwt1/r7v8km/jxee7j> Please join us for our Sixth Annual National Energy Conference [http://d31hzlhk6di2h5.cloudfront.net/20170920/dd/5c/8f/39/82da2674682313b7a…] The Emerging Energy Economy for West Virginia October 20, 2017 | WVU College of Law Event Hall [2017 National Energy Conference at WVU College of Law] <https://t.e2ma.net/click/3cwt1/r7v8km/zpfe7j> The energy industry in the U.S. is undergoing a significant transformation. Utilities are responding to the changing economics of electricity production and to the demands of their largest customers for a low-cost energy supply. Consumers, the environmental community, and regulators are placing increasing expectations that a greater proportion of that supply come from renewable sources, and through more environmentally responsible and less carbon-intensive extraction and production processes. The Sixth Annual Energy Conference<https://t.e2ma.net/click/3cwt1/r7v8km/fige7j>, hosted by the West Virginia University College of Law<https://t.e2ma.net/click/3cwt1/r7v8km/vahe7j>, will focus on these trends in West Virginia, bringing together all parties in this discussion to examine the measures open to policymakers to better position West Virginia to take the lead in developing an environmentally responsible and viable energy future. This free, one-day conference features speakers from industry, academic institutions, public policy organizations, and environmental groups. The conference will feature four panel discussions on the following topics: * Taking advantages of opportunities for a low-carbon economy * Minimizing the environmental impact of energy production and distribution * The expanding role of renewables and energy efficiency * Policy initiatives to position West Virginia to benefit from the new energy economy At lunchtime, two case studies will be presented that examine the opportunities for new jobs in industrial energy efficiency in West Virginia, and the practices used by national parks that enable energy resources to be developed while preserving air, lands, water and climate. Participants in the conference include representatives from the U.S. Department of Energy, Natural Resources Defense Council, The Nature Conservancy, WV SUN, Appalachian Power, National Parks Conservation Association, American Jobs Initiative, Downstream Strategies, RAND Corporation, WV Rivers, Canaan Valley Institute, Energy Efficient WV, Center for Responsible Shale Development and Solar Holler. This year’s National Energy Conference is jointly presented by the Appalachian Stewardship Foundation<https://t.e2ma.net/click/3cwt1/r7v8km/b3he7j> and the College of Law’s Center for Energy & Sustainable Development<https://t.e2ma.net/click/3cwt1/r7v8km/rvie7j>. The conference is free, but registration<https://t.e2ma.net/click/3cwt1/r7v8km/7nje7j> is requested. Register<https://t.e2ma.net/click/3cwt1/r7v8km/ngke7j> National Energy Conference Agenda and Information<https://t.e2ma.net/click/3cwt1/r7v8km/38ke7j> WEST VIRGINIA UNIVERSITY COLLEGE OF LAW 101 Law School Drive | Morgantown, WV 26506-6130 law.wvu.edu <https://t.e2ma.net/click/3cwt1/r7v8km/j1le7j> | (304) 293-5301 | wvulaw(a)mail.wvu.edu<mailto:wvulaw@mail.wvu.edu?subject=> Share this email: [http://d1v4jtnvxv2013.cloudfront.net/media/images/themes/editor/img/socialn…]<https://t.e2ma.net/share/outbound/e/3cwt1/r7v8km> [http://d1v4jtnvxv2013.cloudfront.net/media/images/themes/editor/img/socialn…] <https://t.e2ma.net/share/outbound/t/3cwt1/r7v8km> [http://d1v4jtnvxv2013.cloudfront.net/media/images/themes/editor/img/socialn…] <https://t.e2ma.net/share/outbound/f/3cwt1/r7v8km> [http://d1v4jtnvxv2013.cloudfront.net/media/images/themes/editor/img/socialn…] <https://t.e2ma.net/share/outbound/l/3cwt1/r7v8km> Manage<https://app.e2ma.net/app2/audience/signup/1767092/1740165/744004997/> your preferences | Opt out<https://t.e2ma.net/optout/3cwt1/r7v8km?r=aHR0cHM6Ly9hcHAuZTJtYS5uZXQvYXBwMi…> using TrueRemove™ Got this as a forward? Sign up<https://app.e2ma.net/app2/audience/signup/1767092/1740165.46264709/> to receive our future emails. View this email online<https://t.e2ma.net/message/3cwt1/r7v8km>. PO Box 6130 Morgantown, WV | 26506 US This email was sent to james.kotcon(a)mail.wvu.edu. To continue receiving our emails, add us to your address book. <james.kotcon(a)mail.wvu.edu> [powered by emma]<https://t.e2ma.net/click/3cwt1/r7v8km/ztme7j>

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